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Journal Article
Federal Reserve: The Future of Forward Guidance
Sablik, Timothy (2022-10)
For much of the Fed's history, its leaders prided themselves on their inscrutability. Alan Greenspan, who served as Fed chair from 1987 to 2006, famously perfected the art of "Fedspeak," carefully crafting his statements on monetary policy to be vague and obscure so that he could avoid roiling financial markets. But by the end of his tenure, the Fed had become increasingly transparent in its communications with the public. Today, Fed Chair Jerome Powell holds a press conference after every FOMC meeting, and the committee issues a post-meeting statement explaining both its current policy ...
Econ Focus , Volume 22 , Issue 4Q , Pages 18-21

Working Paper
The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model
Martinez-Garcia, Enrique; Cole, Stephen J. (2020-05-27)
This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. We estimate credibility for the U.S. Federal Reserve with Bayesian methods exploiting survey data on interest rate expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimate of Federal Reserve credibility in terms of forward guidance announcements is relatively high, which indicates a degree of forward guidance effectiveness, but still one that is below the fully credible case. Hence, anticipation ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 375

Speech
Comments on “A Skeptical View of the Impact of the Fed’s Balance Sheet”: remarks at the 2018 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York City
Dudley, William (2018-02-23)
Remarks at the 2018 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York City.
Speech , Paper 275

Working Paper
How Optimal Was U.S. Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound?
Bundick, Brent; Smith, Andrew Lee; Hotz, Logan (2023-12-01)
The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can generate substantial downward pressure on longer-term inflation expectations. We use data on interest rate options and inflation compensation to estimate how the probability that the zero lower bound will bind in the future has weighed on inflation expectations in the United States. Over the 2008–19 period, we estimate that the zero lower bound imparted only a small drag on longer-term inflation expectations of around 10 basis points. We argue that the Federal Reserve's forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases largely offset the ...
Research Working Paper , Paper RWP 23-14

Report
How to escape a liquidity trap with interest rate rules
Duarte, Fernando M. (2016-02-01)
I study how central banks should communicate monetary policy in liquidity trap scenarios in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding. Using a standard New Keynesian model, I argue that the key to anchoring expectations and preventing self-fulfilling deflationary spirals is to promise to keep nominal interest rates pegged at zero for a length of time that depends on the state of the economy. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for this type of state-contingent forward guidance to implement the welfare-maximizing equilibrium as a globally determinate (that is, ...
Staff Reports , Paper 776

Report
An interest rate rule to uniquely implement the optimal equilibrium in a liquidity trap
Zabai, Anna; Duarte, Fernando M. (2015-10-01)
We propose a new interest rate rule that implements the optimal equilibrium and eliminates all indeterminacy in a canonical New Keynesian model in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) is binding. The rule commits to zero nominal interest rates for a length of time that increases in proportion to how much past inflation has deviated?either upward or downward?from its optimal level. Once outside the ZLB, interest rates follow a standard Taylor rule. Following the Taylor principle outside the ZLB is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure uniqueness of equilibria. ...
Staff Reports , Paper 745

Working Paper
Inflation Disagreement Weakens the Power of Monetary Policy
Dong, Ding; Liu, Zheng; Wang, Pengfei; Wei, Min (2025-05-31)
Household inflation disagreement weakens the impact of forward guidance and monetary policy shocks, especially when inflation forecasts are positively skewed. This attenuation effect is not driven by endogenous responses of inflation disagreement to contemporaneous shocks. A model with heterogeneous beliefs about the central bank’s inflation target explains these observations. Agents expecting higher future inflation perceive lower real interest rates and borrow more, constrained by borrowing limits. Increased inflation disagreement results in more borrowing-constrained agents, leading to ...
Working Paper Series , Paper 2024-27

Discussion Paper
The Macroeconomic Effects of Forward Guidance
Patterson, Christina; Giannoni, Marc; Del Negro, Marco (2013-02-25)
In this post, we quantify the macroeconomic effects of central bank announcements about future federal funds rates, or forward guidance. We estimate that a commitment to lowering future rates below market expectations can have fairly strong effects on real economic activity with only small effects on inflation.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20130225

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