Search Results

SORT BY: PREVIOUS / NEXT
Keywords:financial crises 

Discussion Paper
How (Un-)Informed Are Depositors in a Banking Panic? A Lesson from History

How informed or uninformed are bank depositors in a banking crisis? Can depositors anticipate which banks will fail? Understanding the behavior of depositors in financial crises is key to evaluating the policy measures, such as deposit insurance, designed to prevent them. But this is difficult in modern settings. The fact that bank runs are rare and deposit insurance universal implies that it is rare to be able to observe how depositors would behave in absence of the policy. Hence, as empiricists, we are lacking the counterfactual of depositor behavior during a run that is undistorted by the ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20220217

Report
Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?

We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to study whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and non-financial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits decline almost exclusively for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that while regular depositors are uninformed, banks have precise information about which banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1005

Capital flowed from emerging markets as pandemic, economic cycle took hold

Fluctuations in the global financial cycle, reflecting impacts from the COVID crisis, account for roughly one-third of the movement in emerging-market inflows during 2020–23.
Dallas Fed Economics

Report
The Historical Effects of Banking Distress on Economic Activity

The failures of several U.S. regional banks have stimulated discussions about the macroeconomic effects of a likely credit contraction triggered by the recent banking turmoil. Drawing on historical evidence from advanced economies, this study documents a sizable and persistent decline in output and rise in unemployment following non-systemic financial distress. The effects of a systemic banking crisis are two to four times as large. High corporate leverage exacerbates banking turmoil, whereas high bank capitalization and a relatively large share of market financing in corporate debt mitigate ...
Current Policy Perspectives

Discussion Paper
Financial Vulnerability and Macroeconomic Fragility

What is the effect of a hike in interest rates on the economy? Building on recent research, we argue in this post that the answer to this question very much depends on how vulnerable the financial system is. We measure financial vulnerability using a novel concept—the financial stability interest rate r** (or “r-double-star”)—and show that, empirically, the economy is more sensitive to shocks when the gap between r** and current real rates is small or negative.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20230522

Discussion Paper
Why Do Banks Fail? The Predictability of Bank Failures

Can bank failures be predicted before they happen? In a previous post, we established three facts about failing banks that indicated that failing banks experience deteriorating fundamentals many years ahead of their failure and across a broad range of institutional settings. In this post, we document that bank failures are remarkably predictable based on simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements that measure a bank’s insolvency risk and funding vulnerabilities.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20241122

Working Paper
Financial Liberalizations, Booms, and Crashes

Financial liberalization is often seen as a way to deepen credit markets and stimulate economic growth, but it may also fuel credit booms that end in crisis. We construct a new cross-country database of banking regulation policies covering 21 regulatory indicators for 18 advanced economies since World War II. We distinguish liberalizations that directly relax constraints on credit supply from broader financial reforms. Liberalizations that directly affect credit supply lead to substantial expansions in private credit. Credit expansion is concentrated in non-tradable sectors and is not ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2026-034

Report
Uncertain booms and fragility

I develop a framework of the buildup and outbreak of financial crises in an asymmetric information setting. In equilibrium, two distinct economic states arise endogenously: ?normal times,? periods of modest investment, and ?booms,? periods of expansionary investment. Normal times occur when the intermediary sector realizes moderate investment opportunities. Booms occur when the intermediary sector realizes many investment opportunities, but also occur when it realizes very few opportunities. As a result, investors face greater uncertainty in booms. During a boom, subsequent arrival of ...
Staff Reports , Paper 861

Report
Optimal Policy for Macro-Financial Stability

There is a new and now large literature analyzing government policies for financial stability based on models with endogenous borrowing constraints. These normative analyses build upon the concept of constrained efficient allocation, where the social planner is constrained by the same borrowing limit that agents face. In this paper, we show that the same set of policy tools that implement the constrained efficient allocation can be used by a Ramsey planner to replicate the unconstrained allocation, thus achieving higher welfare. The constrained social planner approach may lead to inaccurate ...
Staff Reports , Paper 899

Working Paper
Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007-09 U.S. Financial Crisis

During the 2007-09 financial crisis, there were severe reductions in the liquidity of financial markets, runs on the shadow banking system, and destabilizing defaults and near-defaults of major financial institutions. In response, the Federal Reserve, in its role as lender of last resort (LOLR), injected extraordinary amounts of liquidity. In the aftermath, lawmakers and regulators have taken steps to reduce the likelihood that such lending would be required in the future, including the introduction of liquidity regulations. These changes were motivated in part by the argument that central ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2015-11

FILTER BY year

FILTER BY Content Type

Working Paper 24 items

Report 9 items

Discussion Paper 8 items

Journal Article 5 items

Monograph 1 items

Speech 1 items

show more (1)

FILTER BY Author

Faria-e-Castro, Miguel 6 items

Luck, Stephan 6 items

Benigno, Gianluca 5 items

Schularick, Moritz 5 items

Verner, Emil 5 items

Akinci, Ozge 4 items

show more (86)

FILTER BY Jel Classification

G01 23 items

G2 12 items

G21 12 items

E44 9 items

G28 8 items

E4 7 items

show more (49)

FILTER BY Keywords

bank runs 6 items

banking 6 items

deposit insurance 6 items

monetary policy 6 items

finance 5 items

show more (135)

PREVIOUS / NEXT