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Showing results 1 to 9 of approximately 9.
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Report
Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Banks’ Fire-Sale Vulnerabilities
Banks carry significant exposures to nonbanks from direct dealings, but they can also be exposed, indirectly, through losses in asset values resulting from fire-sale events. We assess the vulnerability of U.S. banks to fire sales potentially originating from any of twelve separate nonbank segments and identify network-like externalities driven by the interconnectedness across nonbank types in terms of asset holdings. We document that such network externalities can contribute to very large multiples of an original fire sale, thus suggesting that conventional assessments of fire-sale ...
Discussion Paper
Externalities in securities clearing and settlement: Should securities CCPs clear trades for everyone?
The architecture of securities clearing and settlement in the United States creates an externality: Investors do not always bear the full cost of settlement risk for their trades and can impose some of these costs on the brokerages where they are customers. When markets are volatile and settlement risk is high, this externality can result in too much or too little trading relative to the efficient level, because investors ignore trading costs but brokerages may refuse to allow investors to trade. Both effects were evident during the recent volatility in GameStop stock. Alternative approaches ...
Working Paper
A Shortage of Short Sales: Explaining the Underutilization of a Foreclosure Alternative
The Great Recession led to widespread mortgage defaults, with borrowers resorting to both foreclosures and short sales to resolve their defaults. I first quantify the economic impact of foreclosures relative to short sales by comparing the home price implications of both. After accounting for omitted variable bias, I find that homes selling as short sales transact at 9.2% to 10.5% higher prices on average than those that sell after foreclosure. Short sales also exert smaller negative externalities than foreclosures, with one short sale decreasing nearby property values by 1 percentage point ...
Working Paper
Counterterrorism Policy: Spillovers, Regime Stability, and Corner Solutions
This paper takes a unique approach to the scenario where a resident terrorist group in a (fragile) developing nation poses a terrorism threat at home and abroad. The host developing nation’s proactive countermeasures against the resident terrorist group not only limits terrorism at home and abroad, but also bolsters regime stability at home. A two-stage game is presented in which the developed country takes a leadership role to institute a tax-subsidy combination to discourage (encourage) proactive measures at home (abroad) in stage 1. Stage 2 involves both nations’ counterterrorism ...
Speech
Misconduct risk, culture and supervision: remarks at the Culture Roundtable Session with Business Schools and Financial Services Industry, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City
Remarks at the Culture Roundtable Session with Business Schools and Financial Services Industry, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.
Speech
The theory and practice of supervision--Remarks at the SIFMA Internal Auditors Society Education Luncheon, Harvard Club, New York City
Remarks at the SIFMA Internal Auditors Society Education Luncheon, Harvard Club, New York City.
Journal Article
How Do Economists Think about the Environment and Climate Change?
While pollution can create a role for government intervention, issues like free-riding and others make reducing global greenhouse gas emissions difficult.
Working Paper
Optimal Epidemic Control in Equilibrium with Imperfect Testing and Enforcement
We analyze equilibrium behavior and optimal policy within a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered epidemic model augmented with potentially undiagnosed agents who infer their health status and a social planner with imperfect enforcement of social distancing. We define and prove the existence of a perfect Bayesian Markov competitive equilibrium and contrast it with the efficient allocation subject to the same informational constraints. We identify two externalities, static (individual actions affect current risk of infection) and dynamic (individual actions affect future disease prevalence), and ...
Speech
Is there room for more monetary cooperation?: panel discussion remarks at the Global Financial Stability in a New Monetary Environment conference, Paris, France
Panel discussion remarks at the Global Financial Stability in a New Monetary Environment conference, Paris, France.