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Keywords:efficiency 

Speech
Policy efficiency in supervision: remarks at Bank Regulation, Lending and Growth, The Bank Policy Institute and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, New York City

Remarks at Bank Regulation, Lending and Growth, The Bank Policy Institute and Columbia University?s School of International and Public Affairs, New York City.
Speech , Paper 309

Journal Article
An Introduction to Web3 with Implications for Financial Services

Web3 is used to describe the next iteration of the internet in which decentralized services are automated on blockchains. This paper describes the elements of Web3 including blockchains and tokens. It describes the largest decentralized finance protocols and some specific services where blockchain and tokens can be used. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of some regulatory challenges.
Policy Hub , Volume 2023 , Issue 3

Working Paper
A theory of targeted search

We present a theory of targeted search, where people with a finite information processing capacity search for a match. Our theory explicitly accounts for both the quantity and the quality of matches. It delivers a unique equilibrium that resides in between the random matching and the directed search outcomes. The equilibrium that emerges from this middle ground is inefficient relative to the constrained Pareto allocation. Our theory encompasses the outcomes of the random matching and the directed search literature as limiting cases.
Working Papers , Paper 1402

Working Paper
Reforming Fiscal Institutions in Resource-Rich Arab Economies: Policy Proposals

This paper traces the evolution of fiscal institutions of Resource-Rich Arab Economies (RRAEs) over time since their pre-oil days, through the discovery of oil to their build-up of oil exports. It then identifies challenges faced by RRAEs and variations in their severity among the different countries over time. Finally, it articulates specific policy reforms, which, if implemented successfully, could help to overcome these challenges. In some cases, however, these policy proposals may give rise to important trade-offs that will have to be evaluated carefully in individual cases.
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 346

Working Paper
Time Use and the Efficiency of Heterogeneous Markups

What are the welfare implications of markup heterogeneity across firms? In standard monopolistic competition models, such heterogeneity implies inefficiency even in the presence of free entry. We enrich the standard model with heterogeneous firms so that preferences are non-separable in off-market time and market consumption and show that this changes the welfare implications of markup heterogeneity. In this context, homogeneity of markups is neither necessary nor sufficient for efficiency. The marginal cost of the marginal firm is weakly inefficiently high when off-market time and market ...
Working Papers , Paper 23-28

Report
Replacement hiring and the productivity-wage gap

A large and growing share of hires in the United States are replacement hires. This increase coincides with a growing productivity-wage gap. We connect these trends by building a model where firms post long-lived vacancies and engage in on-the-job search for more productive workers. These features improve a firm's bargaining position while raising workers' job insecurity and the wedge between hiring and meeting rates. All three channels lower wages while raising productivity. Quantitatively, increased replacement hiring explains half the increase in the productivity-wage gap. The socially ...
Staff Reports , Paper 860

Working Paper
Optimal Epidemic Control in Equilibrium with Imperfect Testing and Enforcement

We analyze equilibrium behavior and optimal policy within a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered epidemic model augmented with potentially undiagnosed agents who infer their health status and a social planner with imperfect enforcement of social distancing. We define and prove the existence of a perfect Bayesian Markov competitive equilibrium and contrast it with the efficient allocation subject to the same informational constraints. We identify two externalities, static (individual actions affect current risk of infection) and dynamic (individual actions affect future disease prevalence), and ...
Working Papers , Paper 21-15

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