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Working Paper
Debt Collection Agencies and the Supply of Consumer Credit
This paper finds that stricter laws regulating third-party debt collection reduce the number of third-party debt collectors, lower the recovery rates on delinquent credit card loans, and lead to a modest decrease in the openings of new revolving lines of credit. Further, stricter third-party debt collection laws are associated with fewer consumer lawsuits against third-party debt collectors but not with a reduction in the overall number of consumer complaints. Overall, stricter third-party debt collection laws appear to restrict access to new revolving credit but have an ambiguous effect on ...
Report
Access to credit and financial health: evaluating the impact of debt collection
Despite the prevalence of debt collection and the intense regulatory activity surrounding this industry, little is known about how these practices impact consumers. This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the effect of debt collection on consumer credit and on indicators of financial health, employing individual credit record data and a difference-in-differences research design that compares outcomes for consumers in states that increased the restrictiveness of legislation with those for consumers in the remaining states. We find consistent evidence that restricting collection activities ...
Working Paper
Modeling the Revolving Revolution: The Debt Collection Channel
We investigate the role of information technology (IT) in the collection of delinquent consumer debt. We argue that the widespread adoption of IT by the debt collection industry in the 1990s contributed to the observed expansion of unsecured risky lending such as credit cards. Our model stresses the importance of delinquency and private information about borrower solvency. The prevalence of delinquency implies that the costs of debt collection must be borne by lenders to sustain incentives to repay debt. IT mitigates informational asymmetries, allowing lenders to concentrate collection ...
Working Paper
The Economics of Debt Collection: Enforcement of Consumer Credit Contracts
Creditors often outsource the task of obtaining repayment from defaulting borrowers to third-party debt collectors. We argue that by hiring third-party debt collectors, creditors can avoid competing in terms of their debt collection practices. This explanation fits several empirical facts about third-party debt collection and is consistent with the evidence that third-party debt collectors use harsher debt collection practices than original creditors. Our model shows that the impact of third-party debt collectors on consumer welfare depends on the riskiness of the pool of borrowers and ...