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Keywords:credit misallocation 

Working Paper
Imperfect Information Transmission from Banks to Investors: Macroeconomic Implications

We study the interaction of information production in loan-backed asset markets and credit allocation in a general equilibrium framework. Originating banks can screen their borrowers, but can inform investors of their asset type only through an error-prone rating technology. The premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of screening effort. Because the rating technology is imperfect, this premium is insufficient to induce the efficient level of screening. However, the fact that banks know their asset quality and produce ratings accordingly helps keep the premium ...
Working Papers , Paper 2018-18

Report
Extend-and-Pretend in the U.S. CRE Market

We show that banks “extended-and-pretended” their impaired CRE mortgages in the post-pandemic period to avoid writing off their capital, leading to credit misallocation and a buildup of financial fragility. We detect this behavior using loan-level supervisory data on maturity extensions, bank assessment of credit risk, and realized defaults for loans to property owners and REITs. Extend-and-pretend crowds out new credit provision, leading to a 4.8–5.3 percent drop in CRE mortgage origination since 2022:Q1 and fuels the amount of CRE mortgages maturing in the near term. As of 2023:Q4, ...
Staff Reports , Paper 1130

Working Paper
Imperfect Information Transmission from Banks to Investors: Macroeconomic Implications

Our goal is to elucidate the interaction of banks' screening effort and strategic information production in loan-backed asset markets using a general equilibrium framework. Asset quality is unobserved by investors, but banks may purchase error-prone ratings. The premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of banks' screening effort. The fact that rating strategies reflect banks' private information about asset quality helps keep this premium high. Conventional regulatory policies interfere with this decision margin, thereby reducing signaling value of high ratings and ...
Working Papers , Paper 2018-18

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