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Discussion Paper
Assessing Contagion Risk in a Financial Network
Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been an explosion of research trying to understand and quantify the default spillovers that can arise through counterparty risk. This first of two posts delves into the analysis of financial network contagion through this spillover channel. The authors introduce a framework, originally developed by Eisenberg and Noe, that is useful for thinking about default cascades.
Speech
The supply of money-like assets: remarks for American Economic Association panel session: The Balance Sheets of Central Banks and the Shortage of Safe Assets, Philadelphia
Remarks for American Economic Association Panel Session: The Balance Sheets of Central Banks and the Shortage of Safe Assets, Philadelphia.
Speech
The Federal Reserve’s counterparty framework: past, present, and future
Remarks at the 2015 Roundtable on Treasury Markets and Debt Management, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.
Discussion Paper
How Large are Default Spillovers in the U.S. Financial System?
When a financial firm defaults on its counterparties, the counterparties may in turn become unable to pay their own creditors, and so on. This domino effect can quickly propagate through the financial system, creating undesirable spillovers and unnecessary defaults. In this post, the authors use the framework discussed in the first post of this two-part series to answer the question: How vulnerable is the U.S. financial system to default spillovers?