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Journal Article
The Fed and Its Shadow: A Historical View
Central bank policies have always incorporated both a discretionary or active component and a passive component. Successful central banking has required a coordination of the two components. After a period of apparent dormancy, the passive component of monetary policy has emerged from the shadows and become relevant for Federal Reserve policy today.
Working Paper
The Predictability of Global Monetary Policy Surprises
Markets systematically misprice interest rate changes around central bank announcements. I show that the strongest predictor of this mispricing is recent change in global interest rates. More specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in global short-term interest rates in the 15 days before a central bank meeting is associated with a 12-basis point surprise increase in short-term rates at that meeting. I demonstrate that this is the result of markets underreacting to signals coming from the global interest rate cycle.
Working Paper
Looking Beyond the Fed: Do Central Banks Cause Information Effects?
The importance of central bank information effects is the subject of an ongoing debate. Most work in this area focuses on the limited number of monetary policy events at the Federal Reserve. I assess the degree to which nine other central banks cause information effects. This analysis yields a much larger panel of primarily novel events. Following a surprise monetary tightening, economic forecasts improve in line with information effects. However, I find this outcome is driven by the predictability of monetary policy surprises and not information effects. My results support the view that ...
Working Paper
To What Degree and through Which Channel Do Central Banks Other Than the Federal Reserve Cause Spillovers?
Spillovers play a crucial role in driving monetary policy around the world. The literature focuses predominantly on spillovers from the Federal Reserve. Less attention has been paid to spillovers from other central banks. I measure the degree to which 20 central banks cause spillovers. I show that central banks in medium- to high-income countries cause spillovers to medium- to long-term interest rates in similar countries through a bond-pricing channel. These effects are narrower than spillovers from the Federal Reserve, which also affect emerging markets, short-term interest rates, and other ...
Working Paper
The Information Effect, Policy Rule Ambiguity, and the Decomposition of Monetary Policy Surprises
I study a New Keynesian economy in which the private sector has imperfect information about both the underlying shock and the monetary policy rule. The information effect of monetary policy makes the two sources of imperfect information interact with each other. On the normative side, I show that the conventional certainty equivalence result regarding optimal monetary policy breaks down. The optimal policy rule becomes less responsive to the underlying shock, and depends on the degree of rule ambiguity. On the positive side, in a dynamic New Keynesian model calibrated to the US economy, I ...
Working Paper
Deposit Convexity, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
In principle, bank deposits can be withdrawn on demand. In practice, depositors tend to maintain stable balances for long periods, allowing banks to fund long-dated assets. Nevertheless, the cost of deposit funding influences banks’ capacity for maturity transformation. Banks and researchers conventionally model the response of deposit interest rates to market interest rates as constant, implying that deposits have nearly constant duration. Contrary to this standard assumption, we show empirically that the “beta” of deposit rates to market rates increases as market rates rise, causing ...
Working Paper
A Macroeconomic Model of Central Bank Digital Currency
We develop a quantitative New Keynesian DSGE model with monopolistic banks to study the macroeconomic effects of introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC). Households benefit from an expansion of liquidity services and higher deposit rates as bank deposit market power is curtailed, while bank profitability and lending decline. We assess this trade-off for a wide range of economies that differ in their level of interest rates. We find substantial welfare gains from introducing a CBDC with an optimal rate that can be approximated by a simple rule of thumb: the maximum between 0% and ...
Working Paper
Theodore Roosevelt, the Election of 1912, and the Founding of the Federal Reserve
This paper examines how the election of 1912 changed the makeup of Congress and led to the Federal Reserve Act. The decision of Theodore Roosevelt and other Progressives to run as third-party candidates split the Republican Party and enabled Democrats to capture the White House and Congress. We show that the election produced a less polarized Congress and that newly-elected members were more likely to support the act. Absent their interparty split, Republicans would likely have held the White House and Congress, and any legislation to establish a central bank would have been unlikely or ...
Working Paper
Theodore Roosevelt, the Election of 1912, and the Founding of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve Act was the outcome of compromises among competing economic and political interests. Numerous studies examine how the act came together but largely take the makeup of Congress and the Administration as given rather than considering the unique circumstances that led to that political distribution. This paper examines how the election of 1912 changed the makeup of Congress and increased the likelihood of central banking legislation and shaped the act. The decision of Theodore Roosevelt and other Progressives to run as third-party candidates split the Republican Party and ...
Working Paper
Theodore Roosevelt, the Election of 1912, and the Founding of the Federal Reserve
This paper examines how the election of 1912 changed the makeup of Congress and led to the Federal Reserve Act. The decision of Theodore Roosevelt and other Progressives to run as third-party candidates split the Republican Party and enabled Democrats to capture the White House and Congress. We show that the election produced a less polarized Congress and that new members were more likely to support the Act. Absent the Republican split, Republicans would likely have held the White House and Congress, and enactment of legislation to establish a central bank would have been unlikely or ...