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Discussion Paper
The Value of Opacity in a Banking Crisis
During moments of heightened economic uncertainty, authorities often need to decide on how much information to disclose. For example, during crisis periods, we often observe regulators limiting access to bank‑level information with the goal of restoring the public's confidence in banks. Thus, information management often plays a central role in ending financial crises. Despite the perceived importance of managing information about individual banks during a financial crisis, we are not aware of any empirical work that quantifies the effect of such policies. In this blog post, we highlight ...
Report
A Framework for Studying the Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America, 1960–2017
We develop a conceptual framework for analyzing the interactions between aggregate fiscal policy and monetary policy. The framework draws on existing models that analyze sovereign debt crises and balance-of-payments crises. We intend this framework as a guide for analyzing the monetary and fiscal history of a set of eleven major Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela—from the 1960s until now.
Journal Article
Transmission of Sovereign Risk to Bank Lending
Banks hold a significant exposure to their own sovereigns. An increase in sovereign risk may hurt banks' balance sheets, causing a decrease in lending and a decline in economic activity. We quantify the transmission of sovereign risk to bank lending and provide new evidence about the effect of sovereign risk on economic outcomes. We consider the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey as an exogenous shock leading to an increase in Turkey's default risk. Our empirical estimates show that, for banks holding a higher amount of government securities, the exogenous change in sovereign default risk ...
Discussion Paper
Banks Runs and Information
The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank (SB) has raised questions about the fragility of the banking system. One striking aspect of these bank failures is how the runs that preceded them reflect risks and trade-offs that bankers and regulators have grappled with for many years. In this post, we highlight how these banks, with their concentrated and uninsured deposit bases, look quite similar to the small rural banks of the 1930s, before the creation of deposit insurance. We argue that, as with those small banks in the early 1930s, managing the information around SVB and ...
Working Paper
Central banks as lender of last resort: experiences during the 2007-2010 crisis and lessons for the future
During the 2007-2010 financial crisis, central banks accumulated a vast amount of experience in acting as lender of last resort. This paper reviews the various ways that central banks provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) during the crisis, and discusses issues for the design of ELA arising from that experience. In a number of ways, the emergency liquidity assistance since 2007 has largely adhered to Bagehot's dictums of lending freely against good collateral to solvent institutions at a penalty rate. But there were many exceptions to these rules. Those exceptions illuminate the ...
Report
Lessons from the Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America
Studying the modern economic histories of eleven of the largest countries in Latin America teaches us that a lack of fiscal discipline has been at the root of most of the region's macroeconomic instability. The lack of fiscal discipline, however, takes various forms, not all of them measured in the primary deficit. Especially important have been implicit or explicit guarantees to the banking system; denomination of the debt in US dollars and short maturity of the debt; and transfers to some agents in the private sector, which are large in times of crisis and are not part of the budget ...
Report
Information Management in Times of Crisis
How does information management and control affect bank stability? Following a national bank holiday in 1933, New York state bank regulators suspended the publication of balance sheets of state-charter banks for two years, whereas the national-charter bank regulator did not. We use this divergence in policies to examine how the suspension of bank-specific information affected depositors. We find that state-charter banks experienced significantly less deposit outflows than national-charter banks in 1933. However, the behavior of bank deposits across both types of banks converged in 1934 after ...
Working Paper
Sovereign Risk and Bank Lending: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Disaster
We quantify the sovereign-bank doom loop by using the 1999 Marmara earthquake as an exogenousshock leading to an increase in Turkey’s default risk. Our theoretical model illustrates that for banks withhigher exposure to government securities, a higher sovereign default risk implies lower net worth andtightening financial constraint. Our empirical estimates confirm the model’s predictions, showing that theexogenous change in sovereign default risk tightens banks’ financial constraints significantly for banks thathold a higher amount of government securities. The resulting tighter bank ...