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Keywords:bank supervision 

Discussion Paper
A Peek behind the Curtain of Bank Supervision

Since the financial crisis, bank regulatory and supervisory policies have changed dramatically both in the United States (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) and abroad (Third Basel Accord). While these shifts have occasioned much debate, the discussion surrounding supervision remains limited because most supervisory activity? both the amount of supervisory attention and the demands for corrective action by supervisors?is confidential. Drawing on our recent staff report ?Parsing the Content of Bank Supervision,? this post provides a peek behind the scenes of bank ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20160414

Discussion Paper
Can I Speak to Your Supervisor? The Importance of Bank Supervision

In March of 2023, the U.S. banking industry experienced a period of significant turmoil involving runs on several banks and heightened concerns about contagion. While many factors contributed to these events—including poor risk management, lapses in firm governance, outsized exposures to interest rate risk, and unrecognized vulnerabilities from interconnected depositor bases, the role of bank supervisors came under particular scrutiny. Questions were raised about why supervisors did not intervene more forcefully before problems arose. In response, supervisory agencies, including the Federal ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20240415

Report
Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade-offs and Outcomes

We estimate a structural model of resource allocation on work hours of Federal Reserve bank supervisors to disentangle how supervisory technology, preferences, and resource constraints impact bank outcomes. We find a significant effect of supervision on bank risk and large technological scale economies with respect to bank size. Consistent with macro-prudential objectives, revealed supervisory preferences disproportionately weight larger banks, especially post-2008 when a resource reallocation to larger banks increased risk on average across all banks. Shadow cost estimates show tight ...
Staff Reports , Paper 769

Working Paper
Scenario-based Quantile Connectedness of the U.S. Interbank Liquidity Risk Network

We characterize the U.S. interbank liquidity risk network based on a supervisory dataset, using a scenario-based quantile network connectedness approach. In terms of methodology, we consider a quantile vector autoregressive model with unobserved heterogeneity and propose a Bayesian nuclear norm estimation method. A common factor structure is employed to deal with unobserved heterogeneity that may exhibit endogeneity within the network. Then we develop a scenario-based quantile network connectedness framework by accommodating various economic scenarios, through a scenario-based moving average ...
Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers , Paper SRA 24-02

Speech
Keynote Address at the Institute for International Bankers Annual Seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory Examination/Compliance Issues

Keynote Address at the Institute for International Bankers Annual Seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory Examination/Compliance Issues.
Speech , Paper 224

Report
Parsing the content of bank supervision

We measure bank supervision using the database of supervisory issues, known as matters requiring attention or immediate attention, raised by Federal Reserve examiners to banking organizations. The volume of supervisory issues increases with banks? asset size, especially for the largest and most complex banks, and decreases with profitability and the quality of the loan portfolio. Stressed banks are faster at resolving issues, but all else equal, resolving new issues takes longer the more issues a bank faces, which may suggest capacity constraints in addressing multiple supervisory issues. ...
Staff Reports , Paper 770

Report
Supervising large, complex financial companies: what do supervisors do?

The Federal Reserve is responsible for the prudential supervision of bank holding companies (BHCs) on a consolidated basis. Prudential supervision involves monitoring and oversight to assess whether these firms are engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, as well as ensuring that firms are taking corrective actions to address such practices. Prudential supervision is interlinked with, but distinct from, regulation, which involves the development and promulgation of the rules under which BHCs and other regulated financial intermediaries operate. This paper describes the Federal Reserve?s ...
Staff Reports , Paper 729

Journal Article
Supervising large, complex financial institutions: what do supervisors do?

The supervision of large, complex financial institutions is one of the most important, but least understood, activities of the Federal Reserve. Supervision entails monitoring and oversight to assess whether firms are engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, and to ensure that firms take appropriate action to correct such practices. It is distinct from regulation, which involves the development and promulgation of the rules under which firms operate. This article brings greater transparency to the Federal Reserve?s supervisory activities by considering how they are structured, staffed, and ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue 23-1 , Pages 57-77

Discussion Paper
How Does Supervision Affect Banks?

Supervisors monitor banks to assess the banks? compliance with rules and regulations but also to ensure that they engage in safe and sound practices (see our earlier post What Do Banking Supervisors Do?). Much of the work that bank supervisors do is behind the scenes and therefore difficult for outsiders to measure. In particular, it is difficult to know what impact, if any, supervisors have on the behavior of banks. In this post, we describe a new Staff Report in which we attempt to measure the impact that supervision has on bank performance. Does more attention by supervisors lead to lower ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20160413

Working Paper
The Failure of supervisory stress testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have adopted stress testing as a central tool for supervising large, complex, financial institutions and promoting financial stability. Although supervisory stress testing may confer substantial benefits, such tests are vulnerable to model risk. This paper studies the risk-based capital stress test conducted by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that are central to the U.S. housing finance ...
Working Papers , Paper 15-4

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