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Working Paper
The Impact of Reserves Practices on Bank Opacity
Using a banking firm?s unexpected loan loss provision to proxy for earnings management, it is found to have a significantly positive effect on bank opacity. The explanatory power of earnings management on bank opacity is stronger during the pre-crisis period than during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. When we examine the effects of delays in loan loss recognition on bank opacity, we found strong statistical relations during the financial crisis period, while the results for the pre-crisis period are mixed. We conclude that bank opacity is related to unexpected loan loss provision as well as ...
Discussion Paper
The Value of Opacity in a Banking Crisis
During moments of heightened economic uncertainty, authorities often need to decide on how much information to disclose. For example, during crisis periods, we often observe regulators limiting access to bank‑level information with the goal of restoring the public's confidence in banks. Thus, information management often plays a central role in ending financial crises. Despite the perceived importance of managing information about individual banks during a financial crisis, we are not aware of any empirical work that quantifies the effect of such policies. In this blog post, we highlight ...
Discussion Paper
Stress Test Success and Bank Opacity
In contemplating the recent financial panic, it is easy to get lost in the weeds of repo markets and asset-backed securities and lose sight of the fact that, at the fundamental level, the panic was about inadequate information. Investors were uncertain about what particular assets were worth, and they were uncertain about which banks were exposed to those assets and to what degree. They were also uncertain about how the government would handle undercapitalized banks. It was against this background that the Treasury announced in February 2009 that the nineteen largest U.S. bank holding ...
Report
Information Management in Times of Crisis
How does information management and control affect bank stability? Following a national bank holiday in 1933, New York state bank regulators suspended the publication of balance sheets of state-charter banks for two years, whereas the national-charter bank regulator did not. We use this divergence in policies to examine how the suspension of bank-specific information affected depositors. We find that state-charter banks experienced significantly less deposit outflows than national-charter banks in 1933. However, the behavior of bank deposits across both types of banks converged in 1934 after ...