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Keywords:bank liquidity OR Bank liquidity OR Bank Liquidity 

Speech
Fixing wholesale funding to build a more stable financial system

Remarks at the New York Bankers Association's 2013 Annual Meeting & Economic Forum, The Waldorf Astoria, New York City.
Speech

Speech
Remarks at the New York Bankers Association Hudson Valley Regional Meeting

Remarks at the NYBA Hudson Valley Regional Meeting, Kingston, New York.
Speech

Working Paper
Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments

I explore alternative central bank policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments. I use a mechanism design approach so that agents' incentives to default are explicit and contingent on the credit policy designed. In the first policy, the central bank invests in costly enforcement and charges an interest rate to recover costs. I show that the second best solution is not distortionary. In the second policy, the central bank requires collateral. If collateral does not bear an opportunity cost, then the solution is first best. Otherwise, the second best is distortionary because ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2005-55

Journal Article
Statement issued October 20, 1987 on providing liquidity to the financial system

Federal Reserve Bulletin , Issue Dec

Journal Article
Central bank dollar swap lines and overseas dollar funding costs

In the decade prior to the financial crisis, foreign banks? exposure to U.S.-dollar-denominated assets rose dramatically. When the crisis hit in 2007, the banks? access to dollar funding came under severe duress, with potentially dire consequences for global financial markets that could also spread to U.S. markets. The Federal Reserve responded in December 2007 by establishing temporary reciprocal currency swap lines, or facilities, with foreign central banks designed to ameliorate dollar funding stresses overseas. Drawing on rigorous analysis of the swaps, as well as insights of other ...
Economic Policy Review , Volume 17 , Issue May , Pages 3-20

Conference Paper
Harming depositors and helping borrowers: the disparate impact of bank consolidation

There is growing evidence showing that large and small banks differ in how they service retail customers. Large, multi-market banks (LMBs) have more standardized operations and set interest rates that are uniform across local markets, while small banks have greater autonomy to set rates according to local market conditions. LMBs also differ from smaller banks by having relatively greater access to wholesale funding. This paper presents a model of spatial competition where small, single-market banks compete with LMBs. It shows that market-extension mergers by LMBs promote competition in ...
Proceedings , Paper 939

Report
A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets

Financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter-bank loans, reflected in the one-month and three-month Libor. We explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks? precautionary demand for liquidity. Asset shocks impair a bank?s ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage. In turn, banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan. High levels of short-term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing. In ...
Staff Reports , Paper 498

Speech
Liquidity and systemic risk.

Presented by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond's 2008 Credit Markets Symposium, The Changing Business of Banking, Charlotte, North Carolina, April 18, 2008
Speech , Paper 12

Report
Financial intermediary leverage and value at risk

We study a contracting model for the determination of leverage and balance sheet size for financial intermediaries that fund their activities through collateralized borrowing. The model gives rise to two features: First, leverage is procyclical in the sense that leverage is high when the balance sheet is large. Second, leverage and balance sheet size are both determined by the riskiness of assets. For U.S. investment banks, we find empirical support for both features of our model, that is, leverage is procyclical, and both leverage and balance sheet size are determined by measured risks. In a ...
Staff Reports , Paper 338

Journal Article
Provision of liquidity through the primary credit facility during the financial crisis: a structural analysis

Professors Erhan Artu and Selva Demiralp of Ko University, Turkey, investigate whether changes to the Federal Reserve?s discount window borrowing facility represent a shift in how the nation?s central bank traditionally provided liquidity through the primary credit facility as well as whether the Fed would benefit from retaining these changes indefinitely. Presented at "Central Bank Liquidity Tools and Perspectives on Regulatory Reform" a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 19-20, 2009.
Economic Policy Review , Volume 16 , Issue Aug , Pages 43-53

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