Search Results
Journal Article
Transmission of Sovereign Risk to Bank Lending
Banks hold a significant exposure to their own sovereigns. An increase in sovereign risk may hurt banks' balance sheets, causing a decrease in lending and a decline in economic activity. We quantify the transmission of sovereign risk to bank lending and provide new evidence about the effect of sovereign risk on economic outcomes. We consider the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey as an exogenous shock leading to an increase in Turkey's default risk. Our empirical estimates show that, for banks holding a higher amount of government securities, the exogenous change in sovereign default risk ...
Working Paper
How Have Banks Been Managing the Composition of High-Quality Liquid Assets?
We study banks' post-crisis liquidity management. We construct time series of U.S. banks' holdings of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) and examine how these assets have been managed in recent years to comply with the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirement. We find that, in becoming LCR compliant, banks initially ramped up their stock of reserve balances. However, once the requirement was met, some banks subsequently shifted the compositions of their liquid portfolios significantly. This raises the question: What drives the compositions of banks? HQLA? We show that a risk-return framework ...
Have Fed Asset Purchases Reshaped Bank Balance Sheets? Part 1
In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Fed bought trillions of dollars in bonds. Did this cause U.S. commercial banks to “de-risk” their assets?
Have Fed Asset Purchases Reshaped Bank Balance Sheets? Part 2
The de-risking of commercial banks’ balance sheets since 2008 likely reflects regulatory changes and economic conditions rather than the Fed’s bond buying.
Speech
Panel Remarks: Supervisory and Regulatory Action to Support the Economy and Protect Consumers
Panel Remarks at The Fed and Main Street during the Coronavirus Pandemic, WebEx event, April 23, 2020.
Working Paper
Sovereign Risk and Bank Lending: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Disaster
We quantify the sovereign-bank doom loop by using the 1999 Marmara earthquake as an exogenousshock leading to an increase in Turkey’s default risk. Our theoretical model illustrates that for banks withhigher exposure to government securities, a higher sovereign default risk implies lower net worth andtightening financial constraint. Our empirical estimates confirm the model’s predictions, showing that theexogenous change in sovereign default risk tightens banks’ financial constraints significantly for banks thathold a higher amount of government securities. The resulting tighter bank ...