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Working Paper
Navigating Higher Education Insurance: An Experimental Study on Demand and Adverse Selection
Balakrishnan, Sidhya; Bettinger, Eric; Kofoed, Michael S.; Ritter, Dubravka; Webber, Douglas A.; Aksu, Ege; Hartley, Jonathan S. (2024-04-19)
We conduct a survey-based experiment with 2,776 students at a non-profit university to analyze income insurance demand in education financing. We offered students a hypothetical choice: either a federal loan with income-driven repayment or an income-share agreement (ISA), with randomized framingof downside protections. Emphasizing income insurance increased ISA uptake by 43%. We observe that students are responsive to changes in contract terms and possible student loan cancellation, which is evidence of preference adjustment or adverse selection. Our results indicate that framing specific ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2024-024

Working Paper
Old, Frail, and Uninsured: Accounting for Puzzles in the U.S. Long-Term Care Insurance Market
Braun, R. Anton; Koreshkova, Tatyana; Kopecky, Karen A. (2017-03-01)
Half of U.S. 50-year-olds will experience a nursing home stay before they die, and one in ten will incur out-of-pocket long-term care expenses in excess of $200,000. Surprisingly, only about 10% of individuals over age 62 have private long-term care insurance (LTCI). This paper proposes a quantitative equilibrium optimal contracting model of the LTCI market that features screening along the extensive margin. Frail and/or poor risk groups are ordered a single contract of no insurance that we refer to as a rejection. According to our model, rejections are the main reason that LTCI take-up rates ...
FRB Atlanta Working Paper , Paper 2017-3

Working Paper
Adverse Selection, Risk Sharing and Business Cycles
Veracierto, Marcelo (2014-10-22)
I consider a real business cycle model in which agents have private information about an idiosyncratic shock to their value of leisure. I consider the mechanism design problem for this economy and describe a computational method to solve it. This is an important contribution of the paper since the method could be used to solve a wide class of models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty. Calibrating the model to U.S. data I find a striking result: That the information frictions that plague the economy have no effects on business cycle fluctuations.
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2014-10

Working Paper
Securities Financing and Asset Markets: New Evidence
Breach , Tomas; King, Thomas B. (2018-11-27)
This paper presents new evidence on bilateral securities financing based on the Federal Reserve's Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey, which was launched in the wake of the financial crisis to provide a window into this otherwise opaque market. The survey asks large broker-dealers about terms at which they fund client positions, and the demand for such funding, across several different collateral types. Within asset classes, reported changes in spreads, haircuts, and other financing terms move closely together, and we show that they also covary with the state of the underlying cash ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2018-22

Working Paper
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets
Lester, Benjamin; Venkateswaran, Venky; Shourideh, Ali; Zetlin-Jones, Ariel (2017-10-10)
We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into a standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium, and use our characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. We show that the relationship between an agent?s type, the quantity he trades, and the price he pays is jointly determined by the severity of adverse selection and the concentration of market power. Therefore, quantifying the effects of adverse selection requires controlling for market ...
Working Papers , Paper 17-35

Report
The use of collateral in bilateral repurchase and securities lending agreements
Cipriani, Marco; Copeland, Adam; Caglio, Cecilia R.; Baklanova, Viktoria (2016-01-01)
We use unique data from U.S. bank holding company-affiliated securities dealers to study the use of collateral in bilateral repurchase and securities lending agreements. Market participants? use of collateral differs substantially across asset classes: for U.S. Treasury securities transactions, we find that haircuts are large enough to provide full protection from default, whereas the same is not usually true for equities transactions. Further, although most of the equities in our sample are each associated with a unique haircut, most of the U.S. Treasury securities are each associated with ...
Staff Reports , Paper 758

Working Paper
Screening on Loan Terms: Evidence from Maturity Choice in Consumer Credit
Liberman, Andres; Paravisini, Daniel; Hertzberg, Andrew (2018-01-31)
We exploit a natural experiment in the largest online consumer lending platform to provide the first evidence that loan terms, in particular maturity choice, can be used to screen borrowers based on their private information. We compare two groups of observationally equivalent borrowers who took identical unsecured 36-month loans; for only one of the groups, a 60-month loan was also available. When a long-maturity option is available, fewer borrowers take the short-term loan, and those who do default less. Additional findings suggest borrowers self-select on private information about their ...
Working Papers , Paper 18-5

Working Paper
Adverse Selection, Lemons Shocks and Business Cycles
Ikeda, Daisuke (2019-04-01)
Asymmetric information is crucial for understanding the disruption of the supply of credit. This paper studies a dynamic economy featuring asymmetric information and resulting adverse selection in credit markets. Entrepreneurs seek loans from banks for projects, but asymmetric information about entrepreneurs' riskiness causes a lemons problem: relatively safe entrepreneurs do not get funded. An increase in the riskiness of some entrepreneurs raises interest rate spreads, aggravates adverse selection, and shrinks the supply of bank credit. The model calibrated to the U.S. economy generates ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 361

Working Paper
Credit Scores and Inequality across the Life Cycle
Chatterjee, Satyajit; Corbae, Dean; Dempsey, Kyle; Ríos-Rull, José-Víctor (2026-02-05)
Credit scores are a primary screening device for the allocation of credit, housing, and sometimes even employment. In the data, credit scores grow and fan out with age; at the same time, income and consumption inequality also increase with a cohort’s age. We postulate a simple model with hidden information to explore the joint determination of credit scores, income, and consumption over an individual’s lifetime which can replicate these empirical facts. We use the model to understand the role of technologies like big data or legal restrictions limiting information on certain adverse ...
Working Papers , Paper 26-07

Working Paper
Securitization and mortgage default
Elul, Ronel (2015-03-25)
We find that private-securitized loans perform worse than observably similar, nonsecuritized loans, which provides evidence for adverse selection. The effect of securitization is strongest for prime mortgages, which have not been studied widely in the previous literature and particular prime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs): These become delinquent at a 30 percent higher rate when privately securitized. By contrast, our baseline estimates for subprime mortgages show that private-securitized loans default at lower rates. We show, however, that ?early defaulting loans? account for this: those ...
Working Papers , Paper 15-15

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