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Speech
Lessons from the financial crisis: remarks at The Economic Club of New York, New York City
Remarks at The Economic Club of New York, New York City.
Speech
Transcript of Moderated Conversation at UC Berkeley Event, US Economy: 10 Years after the Crisis: November 27, 2017
Transcript of Moderated Conversation at UC Berkeley Event, US Economy: 10 Years after the Crisis: November 27, 2017.
Speech
Market and funding liquidity: an overview, remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference, Fernandina Beach, Florida, May 2016
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference, Fernandina Beach, Florida.
Working Paper
Customer Liquidity Provision : Implications for Corporate Bond Transaction Costs
The convention in calculating trading costs in corporate bond markets is to assume that dealers provide liquidity to non-dealers (customers) and calculate average bid-ask spreads that customers pay dealers. We show that customers often provide liquidity in corporate bond markets, and thus, average bid-ask spreads underestimate trading costs that customers demanding liquidity pay. Compared with periods before the 2008 financial crisis, substantial amounts of liquidity provision have moved from the dealer sector to the non-dealer sector, consistent with decreased dealer risk capacity. Among ...
Speech
Principles for financial regulatory reform: remarks at the Princeton Club of New York, New York City
Remarks at the Princeton Club of New York, New York City.
Working Paper
The Volcker Rule and Market-Making in Times of Stress
Focusing on downgrades as stress events that drive the selling of corporate bonds, we document that the illiquidity of stressed bonds has increased after the Volcker Rule. Dealers regulated by the Rule have decreased their market-making activities while non-Volcker-affected dealers have stepped in to provide some additional liquidity. Furthermore, even Volcker-affected dealers that are not constrained by Basel III and CCAR regulations change their behavior, inconsistent with the effects being driven by these other regulations. Since Volcker-affected dealers have been the main liquidity ...
Speech
Transcript of the Cornell College of Business Annual New York City Predictions Event: February 15, 2017
Transcript of the Cornell College of Business Annual New York City Predictions Event: February 15, 2017.
Working Paper
Impact of the Volcker Rule on the Trading Revenue of Largest U.S. Trading Firms During the COVID-19 Crisis Period
Using a novel data collection, we examine the impact of the Volcker Rule on trading revenue of the 21 largest U.S. trading firms during the 100 day stress period centered on the COVID-19 financial crisis. We find that despite the market volatility, trading profits were consistent with volume-driven fees, commissions, and widening of the bid-ask spread. This work adds to the growing body of evidence that a consequence of the Volcker Rule on firm revenue associated with trading is increased financial stability and decreased risk exposure to market shocks.
Discussion Paper
The Effects of Entering and Exiting a Credit Default Swap Index
Since their inception in 2002, credit default swap (CDS) indexes have gained tremendous popularity and become leading barometers of the credit market. Today, investors who want to hedge credit risk or to speculate can choose from a broad menu of indexes that offer protection against the default of a firm, a European sovereign, or a U.S. municipality, among others. The major CDS indexes in the U.S. are the CDX.NA.IG and the CDX.NA.HY, composed of North American investment-grade (IG) and high-yield (HY) issuers, respectively. In this post, we focus on the CDX.NA.IG index. We discuss the ...
Working Paper
Dealer costs and customer choice
We introduce a model to explain how an increase in intermediation costs leads to structural changes in the corporate bond market. We state three facts on corporate bond markets after the Dodd-Frank act: (1) an increase in customer liquidity provision through prearranged matches, (2) a paradoxical decrease in measured illiquidity, and (3) an increase in the illiquidity component on the yield spread. Investors take longer to finish a trade and require higher illiquidity premium even though measured illiquidity decreased. We introduce a search and matching model which explains these facts. It ...