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Keywords:Tariff 

Working Paper
Establishment heterogeneity, exporter dynamics, and the effects of trade liberalization

The authors study the effects of tariffs in a dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model, a monopolistically competitive model with heterogeneity in productivity across establishments and fixed costs of exporting. With fixed costs of starting to export that are on average 3.7 times as large as the costs incurred to continue as an exporter, the model can match both the size distribution of exporters and annual transition in and out of exporting among US manufacturing establishments. The authors find that the tariff equivalent of these fixed costs is nearly 30 percentage points. They use the ...
Working Papers , Paper 11-19

Working Paper
Vertical specialization, intermediate tariffs, and the pattern of trade: assessing the role of tariff liberalization to U.S. bilateral trade 1989-2001

How important are intermediate tariffs in determining trade patterns? Empirical work measuring the impact of tariff liberalization most commonly focuses on the effects of barriers imposed by importers, but exporter trade policy should also matter when exports are produced with imported intermediates. Guided by extensions of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, I study the impact of trade liberalizations on U.S. bilateral trade from 1989-2001. I estimate the impact on U.S. bilateral trade flows of both intermediate tariffs imposed by countries exporting to the United States and U.S. tariffs. My ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 71

Newsletter
Foreign trade zones: growth amid controversy

Chicago Fed Letter , Issue Aug

Working Paper
International duopoly with tariffs

This paper analyzes the effects of a tariff on price-setting duopolists who cannot segment geographically distinct markets; hence, commercial policy has effects in domestic and foreign markets. Although each firm's payoff function is discontinuous, there is a unique equilibrium for an arbitrary tariff. We find that a tariff serves to increase the profits of both the domestic and foreign producer. Moreover, the profits of both firms rise monotonically with the tariff.
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 308

Working Paper
Protectionist demands in globalization

This paper analyzes a small, open economy whose citizens have single-peaked preferences on the tariff rate for an import good. They publicly declare this rate to the government, which has discretion in implementing it. While the government has an incentive not to deviate too much from the publicly chosen tariff rate, its final choice is determined by bargaining with a foreign lobby that has a much lower optimal rate and offers monetary transfers in return for lower tariffs. The authors show that the expectation of foreign influence causes citizens to vote for a more protectionist tariff ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 0006

Journal Article
Free versus fair trade: the dumping issue

Trade liberalization has had little effect on the use of antidumping tariffs - tariffs imposed on imports judged by a government to be unfairly priced. As more countries resort to such tariffs, questions arise about the merits of this form of trade protection, particularly when other remedies are available to industries hurt by import competition.
Current Issues in Economics and Finance , Volume 4 , Issue Aug

Working Paper
Efficient two-part tariffs with uncertainty and interdependent demand

Working Papers , Paper 91-14

Working Paper
Contestable two-part tariffs with income effects

Working Papers , Paper 88-18

Working Paper
The agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures: tying one's hands through the WTO

Why would governments agree to restrict their own discretion in setting domestic policies as part of a trade agreement? This paper examines the welfare consequences of the GATT's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). If countries which join a trade agreement are given free reign over the use of domestic production subsidies, then after negotiating tariff reductions, governments could undermine the agreement by introducing production subsidies to import-competing producers that effectively act as trade barriers. The SCM restricts the use of domestic subsidies by countries ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-06-22

Working Paper
Tariffs and asset market structure: some basic comparative dynamics

Stockman and Dellas (1986) demonstrated that in the presence of complete international asset markets, the relative welfare implications of a small tariffare reversed from standard trade theory. This paper examines the robustness of that result to change in preference parameters and asset market structure. For nearly all values of substitution elasticity and risk aversion, the reversal remains. For very low risk aversion, however, equilibrium outcomes resemble Lerner or Metzler tariffparadoxes. In the latter case, the tariff-imposing country is made better-off. Implications of asset market ...
Working Papers , Paper 1995-009

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