Search Results

(refine search)

SORT BY: PREVIOUS / NEXT

All:
Title:
Author:
Abstract:
Keywords:

+ Add Search Parameter

Speech
Testimony on housing finance reform: essential elements of a government guarantee for mortgage-backed securities
Tracy, Joseph (2013)
Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Washington, D.C.
Speech , Paper 122

Working Paper
Optimal Bidder Selection in Clearing House Default Auctions
Garratt, Rodney; Murphy, David; Nesmith, Travis D.; Wu, Xiaopeng (2024-08-01)
Central counterparties' ability to hold successful default auctions is critically important to financial stability. However, due to the unique features of these auctions, standard auction theory results do not apply. We present a model of CCP default auctions that incorporates both the vital, but non-standard, objective of minimizing the likelihood it suffers reputationally damaging losses and the potential for information leakage to affect CCP members' private portfolio valuations. This gives insight into the key question of how CCPs should select auction participants. In particular, we ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2023-033r1

Speech
Ending too big to fail
Dudley, William (2013)
Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum, New York City.
Speech , Paper 123

Report
Putting systemic risk on the radar screen
Haubrich, Joseph G. (2009)
As the nation ponders its response to the greatest financial crisis in generations, plans for regulatory reform are everywhere. Proposals to break up big financial companies, create a new agency for consumer protection, and lay out additional rules for derivatives, insurance companies, and hedge funds?they?re all on the table.
Annual Report

Working Paper
Do bank bailouts reduce or increase systemic risk? the effects of TARP on financial system stability
Sedunov, John; Berger, Allen N.; Roman, Raluca (2016-10-04)
Theory suggests that bank bailouts may either reduce or increase systemic risk. This paper is the first to address this issue empirically, analyzing the U.S. Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Difference-in-difference analysis suggests that TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for larger and safer banks located in better local economies. This occurred primarily through a capital cushion channel. {{p}} Results are robust to additional tests, including accounting for potential endogeneity and selection bias. Findings yield policy conclusions about the ...
Research Working Paper , Paper RWP 16-8

Speech
Five years since the crisis: where are we now?
Dahlgren, Sarah J. (2013)
Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers' Seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory/Examinations Compliance Issues.
Speech , Paper 120

Speech
A new era of bank supervision
Dahlgren, Sarah J. (2011)
Remarks at the New York Bankers Association Financial Services Forum, New York City.
Speech , Paper 65

Working Paper
Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market
Altinoglu, Levent; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2020-12-02)
The concentration of risk within financial system is considered to be a source of systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions. We build a model of portfolio choice and endogenous contracts in which the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing financial claims to other institutions, relatively risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crisis in a privately optimal way, ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-098

Discussion Paper
On Fire-Sale Externalities, TARP Was Close to Optimal
Eisenbach, Thomas M.; Duarte, Fernando M. (2014-04-15)
Imagine that many large and levered banks suffer heavy losses and must quickly sell assets to reduce their leverage. We expect the market price of the assets sold to decline, at least temporarily. As a result, any other financial institutions that happen to hold the same assets will experience balance sheet losses through no fault of their own —a negative fire-sale externality. In this post, we show that the vulnerability to fire-sale externalities was high during the crisis and that the capital injections of the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) helped reduce it ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140415

show more (30)

PREVIOUS / NEXT

Fed in Print

Search Results

FILTER BY year

FILTER BY Bank

FILTER BY Series

FILTER BY Content Type

FILTER BY Author

FILTER BY Jel Classification

FILTER BY Keywords