Search Results
Working Paper
Competing for order flow in OTC markets
The authors develop a model of a two-sided asset market in which trades are intermediated by dealers and are bilateral. Dealers compete to attract order flow by posting the terms at which they execute trades, which can include prices, quantities, and execution times, and investors direct their orders toward dealers that offer the most attractive terms of trade. Equilibrium outcomes have the following properties. First, investors face a trade-off between trading costs and speeds of execution. Second, the asset market is endogenously segmented in the sense that investors with different asset ...
Working Paper
Trading Relationships in the OTC Market for Secured Claims : Evidence from Triparty Repos
We use a new panel data set on intraday transactions of triparty repos (TPR) to study trading relationships in the over-the-counter market. We test the prediction that search frictions lead to relationship formation. We find that TPR trading parties form relationships with a broad number of counterparties but tend to focus their transaction volumes on only a small set of counterparties. We also find that having stable relationships and broader interactions across other funding markets positively shapes the relationships of investors with dealers in the TPR market. Finally, our results suggest ...
Working Paper
Information Friction in OTC Interdealer Markets
In over-the-counter (OTC) securities markets, interdealer markets are an important venue through which dealers can offload positions and share risk amongst themselves. Contrary to the popular conception that search frictions matter the most in OTC markets, we find that in the interdealer market for U.S. corporate bonds, information frictions are most relevant. Large dealers face large and informed customers and pay more than small dealers to transact in the interdealer market, despite on average providing liquidity to other dealers. Large dealers tend to trade through interdealer brokers ...
Report
Trading Partners in the Interbank Lending Market
There is substantial heterogeneity in the structure of trading relationships in the U.S. overnight interbank lending market: Some banks rely on spot transactions, while a majority form stable, concentrated borrowing relationships to hedge liquidity needs. Borrowers pay lower prices and borrow more from their concentrated lenders. When there are exogenous shocks to liquidity supply (days with low GSE lending), concentrated lenders insulate borrowers from the shocks without charging significantly higher interest rates.