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Working Paper
Minimum Wages, Efficiency and Welfare
It has long been argued that a minimum wage could alleviate efficiency losses from monopsony power. In a general equilibrium framework that quantitatively replicates results from recent empirical studies, we find higher minimum wages can improve welfare, but most welfare gains stem from redistribution rather than efficiency. Our model features oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms and yields analytical expressions that characterize the mechanisms by which minimum wages can improve efficiency, and how these deteriorate at higher minimum wages. We provide a method to ...
Working Paper
Capital requirements in a quantitative model of banking industry dynamics
We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirements on bank risk taking, commercial bank failure, and market structure. We propose a market structure where big, dominant banks interact with small, competitive fringe banks. Banks accumulate securities like Treasury bills and undertake short-term borrowing when there are cash flow shortfalls. A nontrivial size distribution of banks arises out of endogenous entry and exit, as well as banks? buffer stocks of securities. We test the model using business cycle properties and the bank lending ...
Working Paper
Faster Payments: Market Structure and Policy Considerations
This paper reports on a research effort by Federal Reserve staff to examine market structure implications in the still?emerging faster payments market. The analysis and conclusions in this paper are those of the authors and do not indicate official positions of the Board of Governors or Federal Reserve System. Although this paper offers several considerations regarding the U.S. faster payments market, it does not make specific policy recommendations or provide a view on the potential roles, including service provider or other roles, that the Federal Reserve may play in this market.2 Given the ...
Working Paper
Labor Market Power
To measure labor market power in the US economy, we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market. We estimate key model parameters by matching the firm-level relationship between labor market share and employment size and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on (i) imperfect productivity-wage pass-through, (ii) strategic behavior of dominant employers, and (iii) the local labor market impact of mergers. We then measure welfare losses relative to the efficient allocation. ...