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Keywords:Interbank markets 

Working Paper
Filling in the Blanks: Network Structure and Interbank Contagion

The network pattern of financial linkages is important in many areas of banking and finance. Yet bilateral linkages are often unobserved, and maximum entropy serves as the leading method for estimating counterparty exposures. This paper proposes an efficient alternative that combines information-theoretic arguments with economic incentives to produce more realistic interbank networks that preserve important characteristics of the original interbank market. The method loads the most probable links with the largest exposures consistent with the total lending and borrowing of each bank, yielding ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 1416

Working Paper
To sell or to borrow: a theory of bank liquidity management

Research Working Paper , Paper RWP 14-18

Working Paper
The Role of Interbank Relationships and Liquidity Needs

In this paper, we focus on the interconnectedness of banks and the price they pay for liquidity. We assess how the concentration of credit relationships and the position of a bank in the network topology of the system influence the bank?s ability to meet its liquidity demand. We use quarterly data of bilateral interbank credit exposures between all German banks from 2000 to 2008 to measure interbank relationships and the network characteristics. We match these data with the bids placed by the individual banks in the European Central Bank?s (ECB) weekly repo auctions. The bids measure each ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 1421

Working Paper
Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market

The concentration of risk within financial system is considered to be a source of systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions. We build a model of portfolio choice and endogenous contracts in which the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing financial claims to other institutions, relatively risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crisis in a privately optimal way, ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-098

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