Search Results
Showing results 1 to 4 of approximately 4.
(refine search)
Journal Article
New rules for foreign banks: what's at stake?
In response to the financial crisis, stricter rules are being phased in for foreign banks operating on U.S. soil. Mitchell Berlin explains how global banking drives efficiency, how the new rules may impede that efficiency, and why the rules may nevertheless be necessary.
Discussion Paper
Measuring Global Bank Complexity
Paraphrasing a famous Supreme Court opinion: “I know bank complexity when I see it.” This expression probably speaks to the truth that, if we look at a given banking organization, we ought to be able to state whether it is more or less “complex.” And yet, such an approach hardly offers any guidance if one wants to understand the intricacies of global banks and to monitor and regulate them. What should be the appropriate metrics? It seems to us that there is not a consensus just yet on what complexity might mean in the context of banking. The global dimension of a bank adds many ...
Working Paper
A Global Lending Channel Unplugged? Does U.S. Monetary Policy Affect Cross-border and Affiliate Lending by Global U.S. Banks?
We examine how U.S. monetary policy affects the international activities of U.S. Banks. We access a rarely studied U.S. bank-level regulatory dataset to assess at a quarterly frequency how changes in the U.S. Federal funds rate (before the crisis) and quantitative easing (after the onset of the crisis) affects changes in cross-border claims by U.S. banks across countries, maturities and sectors, and also affects changes in claims by their foreign affiliates. We find robust evidence consistent with the existence of a potent global bank lending channel. In response to changes in U.S. monetary ...
Working Paper
Global Banking and Firm Financing: A Double Adverse Selection Channel of International Transmission
This paper proposes a "double adverse selection channel" of international transmission. It shows, theoretically and empirically, that financial systems with both global and local banks exhibit double adverse selection in credit allocation across firms. Global (local) banks have a comparative advantage in extracting information on global (local) risk, and this double information asymmetry creates a segmented credit market where each bank lends to the worst firms in terms of the unobserved risk factor. Given a bank funding (e.g., monetary policy) shock, double adverse selection affects firm ...