Search Results
Working Paper
The GSE implicit subsidy and value of government ambiguity
The housing-related government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the "GSEs") have an ambiguous relationship with the federal government. Most purchasers of the GSEs' debt securities believe that this debt is implicitly backed by the U.S. government despite the lack of a legal basis for such a belief. In this paper, I estimate how much GSE shareholders gain from this ambiguous government relationship. I find that (1) the federal government's implicit subsidy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has resulted in a funding advantage for the GSEs over private sector institutions, (2) ...
Journal Article
Access to FHLBank advances and the performance of thrift institutions
This article examines thrift financial data from 1985 to 1991 and finds that financially distressed thrifts, especially those benefiting from regulatory forbearance policies, tended to borrow more from Federal Home Loan Banks. The authors also find that the stock returns of distressed thrifts reflected the subsidized rates at which they were able to borrow from the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation.
Working Paper
Federal Home Loan Bank lending to community banks: are targeted subsidies necessary?
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 extended the lending authority of Federal Home Loan Banks to include advances secured by small-enterprise loans of community financial institutions. The authors examine three possible reasons for the extension of this selective credit subsidy to community banks and thrifts, including the need to subsidize community depository institutions, stabilize the Federal Home Loan Banks, and address a market failure for small enterprise loans in rural banking markets. They use two empirical models to investigate whether funding constraints affect small-business ...
Working Paper
The Federal Home Loan Bank System: the lender of next-to-last resort?
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a large, complex, and understudied government-sponsored liquidity facility that currently has more than $1 trillion in secured loans outstanding, mostly to commercial banks and thrifts. This paper first documents the significant role played by the FHLB System at the outset of the ongoing financial crisis and then provides evidence about the uses of these funds by their bank and thrift members. We then identify the trade-offs faced by FHLB member-borrowers when choosing between accessing the FHLB System or the Federal Reserve's discount window during ...
Journal Article
Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchases: Implications for mortgage markets
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a government-sponsored enterprise created by Congress to support residential housing finance. Historically, the twelve regional wholesale banks that constitute the FHLB System have pursued this goal by making loans to their depository institution members secured by residential mortgage loans. In 1997, however, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago began purchasing pools of conforming mortgages under its Mortgage Partnership Finance Program. Today, nine FHLBs offer this program, and the remaining three offer their own Mortgage Purchase Programs. ; ...
Journal Article
Is federal home loan bank funding a risky business for the FDIC?
Easy access to FHLB funds has helped community banks stay afloat in today's competitive markets, but could pose a risk to the FDIC's insurance fund.