Working Paper
The GSE implicit subsidy and value of government ambiguity
Passmore, Wayne (2003)
The housing-related government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the "GSEs") have an ambiguous relationship with the federal government. Most purchasers of the GSEs' debt securities believe that this debt is implicitly backed by the U.S. government despite the lack of a legal basis for such a belief. In this paper, I estimate how much GSE shareholders gain from this ambiguous government relationship. I find that (1) the federal government's implicit subsidy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has resulted in a funding advantage for the GSEs over private sector institutions, (2) ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2003-64

Conference Paper
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae: their funding advantage and benefits to consumers
Pearce, James E.; Miller, James C. (2001)
Proceedings , Paper 737

Conference Paper
Federal Deposit Insurance versus federal sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: the structure of subsidy
Carnell, Richard S. (2001)
Proceedings , Paper 738

Conference Paper
Emerging competition and risk-taking incentives at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
White, Lawrence J.; Frame, W. Scott (2004)
Proceedings , Paper 922

Journal Article
The housing giants in plain view
Yeager, Timothy J.; Vaughan, Mark D.; Emmons, William R. (2004-07)
These government-sponsored enterprises continue to make headlines because of their explosive growth and resulting heavyweight status within the nation's financial system.
The Regional Economist , Issue Jul , Pages 4-9

Report
Mortgage rates, homeownership rates, and government-sponsored enterprises
Feldman, Ron J. (2002)
2001 Annual Report essay
Annual Report , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , Pages 4-23

Journal Article
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s changing roles and reform initiatives
anonymous (2002-04)
Financial Update , Volume 15 , Issue Apr , Pages 5

Journal Article
Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's voluntary initiatives: Lessons from banking
Frame, W. Scott; Wall, Larry D. (2002-01)
The federal government has an interest in the financial stability of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of their importance to financial markets and the government's implicit guarantee of their liabilities. ; In October 2000 these two housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) announced six voluntary initiatives. One initiative would enhance market discipline by having the GSEs issue subordinated debt. A second would boost liquidity by having the GSEs maintain a liquid securities portfolio. The other four initiatives would increase transparency by having the GSEs disclose their credit ...
Economic Review , Volume 87 , Issue Q1 , Pages 45-59

Journal Article
Financing housing through government-sponsored enterprises
Frame, W. Scott; Wall, Larry D. (2002-01)
Three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System-were created to improve the availability of home mortgage financing by supplementing local funding. But today's more evolved financial markets enable retail lenders to tap national markets. Thus, the main contribution of the three housing GSEs has become providing homebuyers an interest rate subsidy that is made possible by the GSEs' special relationship with the federal government. ; This article examines the economic issues arising from the provision of such subsidies via the housing ...
Economic Review , Volume 87 , Issue Q1 , Pages 29-43