Journal Article
Interview : Robert Moffitt
Steelman, Aaron (2005-10)
Econ Focus , Volume 9 , Issue Fall , Pages 46-50

Journal Article
Federal Reserve: William McChesney Martin Jr. : a reevaluation
Wood, John H. (2006-01)
Econ Focus , Volume 10 , Issue Win , Pages 2-7

Journal Article
Interview : James Buchanan
Steelman, Aaron (2004-04)
Econ Focus , Volume 8 , Issue Spr , Pages 32-35

Report
Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet Management
Gershun, Natalia; Donaldson, John B.; Giannoni, Marc (2011)
We consider a simple variant of the standard real business cycle model in which shareholders hire a self-interested executive to manage the firm on their behalf. A generic family of compensation contracts similar to those employed in practice is studied. When compensation is convex in the firm?s own dividend (or share price), a given increase in the firm?s output generated by an additional unit of physical investment results in a more than proportional increase in the manager?s income. Incentive contracts of sufficient yet modest convexity are shown to result in an indeterminate general ...
Staff Reports , Paper 531

Journal Article
Federal Reserve : Initiation by fire
Gerena, Charles (2006-10)
Econ Focus , Volume 10 , Issue Fall , Pages 2-5

Journal Article
Interview : Frank Sloan
Gerena, Charles (2005-01)
Econ Focus , Volume 9 , Issue Win , Pages 42-45

Journal Article
Interview : Kenneth Elinzga
Steelman, Aaron (2004-07)
Econ Focus , Volume 8 , Issue Sum , Pages 36-39

Journal Article
Interview : Robert Litan
Steelman, Aaron (2003-01)
Econ Focus , Volume 7 , Issue Win , Pages 32-35

Journal Article
Interview : Susan Athey
Steelman, Aaron (2007-10)
Econ Focus , Volume 11 , Issue Fall , Pages 30-35

Working Paper
Agency problems in public firms: evidence from corporate jets in leveraged buyouts
Edgerton, Jesse (2011)
This paper uses rich, new data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross-section, firms owned by private equity funds average jet fleets at least 40 percent smaller than observably similar publicly-traded firms. Similar fleet reductions are observed within firms that go private in leveraged buyouts. I discuss assumptions under which comparisons across and within firms provide estimates of lower and upper bounds on the average treatment effect of taking a firm from public to private in a leveraged buyout. Both censored and ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2011-15