Search Results
Report
Rediscounting under aggregate risk with moral hazard
In a 1999 paper, Freeman proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different outcomes - an important development because in most of the literature the results of these policy tools are indistinguishable. Freeman's conclusion that the central bank should absorb losses related to default to provide risk-sharing goes against the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses, contrary to Freeman's argument. ...
Conference Paper
Discount window borrowing and liquidity
Journal Article
Recent developments in discount window policy
Journal Article
Walter Bagehot, the discount window, and TAF
Lend freely at a high rate, on good collateral.
Speech
Federal Reserve lending disclosure
Testimony of Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., and Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel of the Board of Governors, before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Journal Article
Federal Reserve lending to troubled banks during the financial crisis, 2007-2010
Numerous commentaries have questioned both the legality and appropriateness of Federal Reserve lending to banks during the recent financial crisis. This article addresses two questions motivated by such commentary: Did the Federal Reserve violate either the letter or spirit of the law by lending to undercapitalized banks? Did Federal Reserve credit constitute a large fraction of the deposit liabilities of failed banks during their last year before failure? The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) imposed limits on the number of days that the Federal Reserve ...