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Report
Defaults and losses on commercial real estate bonds during the Great Depression era
We employ a unique data set of public commercial real estate (CRE) bonds issued during the Great Depression era (1920-32) to determine their frequency of default and total loss given default. Default rates on these bonds far exceeded those originated in subsequent periods, driven in part by the greater economic stress of the Depression as well as the lower level of financial sophistication of investors and structures that prevailed in 1920-32. Our results confirm that making loans with higher loan-to-value ratios results in higher rates of default and loss. They also support the business ...
Working Paper
Money, sticky wages, and the Great Depression
This paper examines the ability of a simple stylized general equilibrium model that incorporates nominal wage rigidity to explain the magnitude and persistence of the Great Depression in the United States. The impulses to our analysis are money supply shocks. The Taylor contracts model is surprisingly successful in accounting for the behavior of major macroaggregates and real wages during the downturn phase of the Depression, i.e., from 1929:3 through mid-1933. Our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that a monetary contraction operating through a sticky wage channel played a ...
Monograph
Closed for the holiday: the bank holiday of 1933
Recaps events leading to the collapse of American banking in March 1933 and describes federal efforts to restore public confidence.
Conference Paper
The Great Depression and the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis
We evaluate the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis that a more accommodative monetary policy could have greatly reduced the severity of the Great Depression.
Working Paper
Capital taxation during the U.S. Great Depression
Previous studies quantifying the effects of increased capital taxation during the U.S. Great Depression find that its contribution is small, both in accounting for the downturn in the early 1930s and in accounting for the slow recovery after 1934. This paper confirms that the effects are small in the case of taxation of business profits, but finds large effects in the case of taxation of dividend income. Tax rates on dividends rose dramatically during the 1930s and, when fed into a general equilibrium model, imply significant declines in investment and equity values and nontrivial declines in ...
Working Paper
Argentina's lost decade and subsequent recovery: hits and misses of the neoclassical growth model
We examine the economic depression that Argentina suffered in the 1980s, as well as the subsequent recovery, from the perspective of growth theory, taking total factor productivity as exogenous. The predictions of the neoclassical growth model conform rather well with the evidence for the "lost decade" depression and at the same time point to a puzzle: Investment did not recover in the subsequent decade of the 1990s nearly as fast as it should have according to that same model.
Working Paper
Monetary policy frameworks and indicators for the Federal Reserve in the 1920s
The 1920s and 1930s saw the Fed reject a state-of-the-art empirical policy framework for a logically defective one. Consisting of a quantity theoretic analysis of the business cycle, the former framework featured the money stock, price level, and real interest rates as policy indicators. By contrast, the Fed?s procyclical needs-of-trade, or real bills, framework stressed such policy guides as market nominal interest rates, volume of member bank borrowing, and type and amount of commercial paper eligible for rediscount at the central bank. The start of the Great Depression put these rival sets ...
Journal Article
The Great Depression in the United States from a neoclassical perspective
Can neoclassical theory account for the Great Depression in the United States?both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933 and the recovery between 1934 and 1939? Yes and no. Given the large real and monetary shocks to the U.S. economy during 1929?33, neoclassical theory does predict a long, deep downturn. However, theory predicts a much different recovery from this downturn than actually occurred. Given the period?s sharp increases in total factor productivity and the money supply and the elimination of deflation and bank failures, theory predicts an extremely rapid recovery that ...