Search Results
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            The 2012 Eurozone Crisis and the ECB’s OMT Program: A Debt-Overhang Banking and Sovereign Crisis Interpretation
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    This paper develops a model to interpret the 2012 eurozone crisis and the ECB?s policy response. In the model, bank lending is distorted by debt overhang, banks hold sovereign bonds, and the government guarantees the bailout of bank creditors. A self-fulfilling pessimistic view of the economy can trigger a banking and sovereign crisis: with pessimistic economic expectations, the value of sovereign bonds declines, the bank risk of default rises, and the debt overhang distortion worsens; this leads to a contraction in bank lending and to a decline in economic activity, which confi rms the ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Corporate Debt Maturity and Business Cycle Fluctuations
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    Long-term debt is the main source of firm-financing in the U.S. We show that accounting for debt maturity is crucial for understanding business cycle dynamics. We develop a macroeconomic model with defaultable long-term debt and equity adjustment costs. With long-term debt, firms have an incentive to increase leverage in order to dilute the value of outstanding debt. When equity issuance is costly, this incentive helps firms raise more debt through a debt dilution channel and mitigates the decline in net worth through a balance sheet channel, dampening the decline in investment in response to ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Journal Article
                                                                                
                                            Breaking the ice: government interventions in frozen markets
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    When subprime mortgage defaults started mounting in 2007, financial institutions found themselves unable to profitably sell off these soured investments or raise new equity. As these institutions struggled to reduce their leverage, consumers and firms alike found it increasingly difficult to borrow, which helped trigger a deep recession. Within the context of two popular explanations for the freeze ? asymmetric information and debt overhang ? Benjamin Lester discusses the costs and benefits of policies aimed at thawing markets in a crisis, including direct asset purchases, equity injections, ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            Debt-Overhang Banking Crises
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    This paper studies how a worsening of the debt overhang distortion on bank lending can explain banking solvency crises that are accompanied by a plunge of bank asset values and by a severe contraction of lending and economic activity. Since the value of bank assets depends on economic prospects, a pessimistic view of the economy can be self-fulfilling and can trigger a financial crisis: If economic prospects are poor, bank asset values decline, the bank risk of default rises, and the associated debt overhang distortion worsens. The worsening of the distortion leads to a contraction in bank ...
                                                                                                
                                            
                                                                                
                                    
                                                                                    Working Paper
                                                                                
                                            The Optimal Response of Bank Capital Requirements to Credit and Risk in a Model with Financial Spillovers
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                        
                                                                                    
                                                                                                    This paper studies optimal bank capital requirements in an economy where bank losses have financial spillovers. The spillovers amplify the effects of shocks, making the banking system and the economy less stable. The spillovers increase with banks? financial distortions, which in turn increase with banks? credit risk. Higher capital requirements dampen the current supply of banks? credit, but mitigate banks? future financial distortions. Capital requirements should be raised in response to both an expansion of banks? credit supply and an increase in the expected future credit risk of banks. ...