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Journal Article
The quest for sound money: currency boards to the rescue
Some countries with high inflation have adopted another nations more stable currency: Panama uses the U.S. dollar, gaining price stability and easier trade with its primary partner. But this arrangement grants an interest-free loan to the government whose currency is used. And the nation using the currency forgoes any income on the foreign currency holdings. ; One alternative, a currency board, achieves the other countrys monetary stability without these costs. Currency boards issue a domestic currency in return for the foreign currency, at a fixed exchange rate. Boards also hold assets ...
Journal Article
A currency board for Indonesia?
Journal Article
Currency board and market intervention in Hong Kong
Journal Article
Dollarization and monetary sovereignty: the case of Argentina
In January, President Menim of Argentina proposed strengthening his country's commitment to monetary stability by replacing the peso with the U.S. dollar. Dollarization leaves Argentina without a lender of last resort, but the Federal Reserve's current operating procedure combines with existing Argentine arrangements to mitigate this drawback.
Journal Article
Currency boards: monetary magic?
Journal Article
Why attack a currency board?
Journal Article
Currency boards: once and future monetary regimes?
A currency board can allow a developing economy to establish its domestic currency relatively promptly and efficiently by fixing the value of its currency to that of another country and guaranteeing that its currency is backed by sufficient foreign exchange reserves. Currency boards not only provide a foundation that encourages traders and investors to accept new currencies, they also do not require sophisticated money markets and central banking operations in order to be effective. Because of these attributes, currency boards have attracted more attention, particularly in the wake of ...
Journal Article
Argentina: the end of convertibility
Journal Article
Argentina, Mexico, and currency boards: another case of rules versus discretion
This article discusses currency boards in light of the recent economic experiences of Mexico and Argentina. Carlos Zarazaga argues that currency boards do not solve the important time inconsistency problem pointed out in the rules-versus-discretion literature. Because of this failure, even the quasi-currency board established by law (the so-called convertibility law) did not protect Argentina from one of its most severe financial crises in modern times. ; In addition, there is the normative issue of whether an ironclad rule such as a currency board rule is superior to a noncontingent one. ...
Working Paper
Currency Boards, Dollarized Liabilities, and Monetary Policy Credibility
The recent collapse of the Argentine currency board raises new questions about the desirability of formal fixed exchange rate regimes in modern developing economies. This paper examines the impact of dollarized liabilities with potential default for a currency board with costly abandonment. We compare the performance of a currency board to a central bank with full discretion in two environments: One with only idiosyncratic firm shocks, and one with both idiosyncratic shocks and shocks to the dollar-euro rate. We show that the possibility of default with peso-valued exports generates a risk ...