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Report
Corporate governance and banks: what have we learned from the financial crisis?
Morrison, Alan; Shapiro, Joel; Mehran, Hamid (2011)
Recent academic work and policy analysis give insight into the governance problems exposed by the financial crisis and suggest possible solutions. We begin this paper by explaining why governance of banks differs from governance of nonfinancial firms. We then look at four areas of governance: executive compensation, boards, risk management, and market discipline. We discuss promising solutions and areas where further research is needed.
Staff Reports , Paper 502

Newsletter
Corporate governance at community banks: a Seventh District analysis
Driscoll, Patrick; DeYoung, Robert; Fried, Colette A. (2005-10)
Community banks can be vulnerable to the same economic tensions and conflicts of interest that have compromised corporate governance at more high-profile firms over the past few years. The authors discuss their preliminary findings from a project designed to construct a systematic database on the corporate governance practices at District community banks.
Chicago Fed Letter , Issue Oct

Journal Article
Lights out : three years after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, questions are mounting about unintended consequences for hundreds of U.S. firms
Campbell, Doug (2005-07)
Econ Focus , Volume 9 , Issue Sum , Pages 13-18

Journal Article
Risk and return of publicly held versus privately owned banks
Kwan, Simon H. (2004-09)
The author divides bank holding companies (BHCs) into four size classes, then categorizes each class according to public or private ownership. He compares the performance and risk across bank size classes between 1986 and 2000 and in five-year windows therein. For the largest BHCs, returns on assets and operating costs do not depend on ownership, but for the smaller BHCs, returns on assets are lower and operating costs are higher for those that are publicly owned. Small public BHCs also hold more capital than do small private ones.
Economic Policy Review , Issue Sep , Pages 97-107

Working Paper
Is auditor independence endogenous: evidence and implications for public policy
Falaschetti, Dino; Orlando, Michael J. (2003-12-01)
This paper examines the extent to which firm-specific levels of auditor-independence are codetermined with alternative inputs to governance production. We identify a number of governance-producing mechanisms that are causally or simultaneously related to auditor independence. These results are shown to be robust to omitted variable bias. Consequently, prescriptive regulation of auditor independence will be at least partly offset by firm adjustments on alternative governance-producing margins. ; Original title: Optimization in production of corporate governance - evidence from auditor ...
Research Working Paper , Paper RWP 03-13

Conference Paper
Corporate governance : a rational course for public policy
Moskow, Michael H. (2003)
Proceedings , Paper 839

Report
When is there a strong transfer risk from the sovereigns to the corporates? Property rights gaps and CDS spreads
Bai, Jennie; Wei, Shang-Jin (2012)
When a sovereign faces the risk of debt default, it may be tempted to expropriate the private sector. This may be one reason why international investment in private companies has to take into account the sovereign risk. But the likelihood of sovereign risk transferring to corporates and increasing their risk of default may be mitigated by legal institutions that provide strong property rights protection. Using a novel credit default swaps (CDS) data set covering government and corporate entities across thirty countries, we study both the average strength of the transfer risks and the role of ...
Staff Reports , Paper 579

Journal Article
Accounting for corporate behavior
Weinberg, John A. (2003-07)
Economic Quarterly , Volume 89 , Issue Sum , Pages 1-20

Working Paper
Bank Complexity, Governance, and Risk
Goldberg, Linda S.; Correa, Ricardo (2020-07-02)
Bank holding companies (BHCs) can be complex organizations, conducting multiple lines of business through many distinct legal entities and across a range of geographies. While such complexity raises the the costs of bank resolution when organizations fail, the effect of complexity on BHCs' broader risk profiles is less well understood. Business, organizational, and geographic complexity can engender explicit trade-offs between the agency problems that increase risk and the diversification, liquidity management, and synergy improvements that reduce risk. The outcomes of such trade-offs may ...
International Finance Discussion Papers , Paper 1287

Conference Paper
Corporate governance of bank mergers
Campbell, Terry L.; Becher, David A. (2004)
By investigating the extent to which target directors bargain in their own interests during negotiations between merging banks, we document a strong inverse relation between merger premium and target director retention. This relation holds for both executive (inside) directors and independent outside directors, and other governance mechanisms of targets and bidders fail to diminish this finding. Moreover, individual target director retention is conditioned by the relative size but not by prior target performance. Overall, our results suggest some target directors exercise their bargaining ...
Proceedings , Paper 918

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