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Firm dynamics and financial development
This paper studies the impact of cross-country variation in financial market development on firms? financing choices and growth rates using comprehensive firm-level datasets. We document that in less financially developed economies, small firms grow faster and have lower debt to asset ratios than large firms. We then develop a quantitative model where financial frictions drive firm growth and debt financing through the availability of credit and default risk. We parameterize the model to the firms? financial structure in the data and show that financial restrictions can account for the ...
Working Paper
Non-exclusive contracts, collateralized trade, and a theory of an exchange
Liquid markets where agents have limited capacity to sign exclusive contracts may permit agents to promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. I show that in such markets an exchange can arise as an intermediary whose only role is to set limits on the number of contracts that agents can report voluntarily. In some cases, these limits must be non-binding in equilibrium, and reported trades must not be made public. A (costly) alternative to an exchange is collateralized trade, and the gains from an exchange increase when agents have more intangible capital (e.g., ...
Report
Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet Management
We consider a simple variant of the standard real business cycle model in which shareholders hire a self-interested executive to manage the firm on their behalf. A generic family of compensation contracts similar to those employed in practice is studied. When compensation is convex in the firm?s own dividend (or share price), a given increase in the firm?s output generated by an additional unit of physical investment results in a more than proportional increase in the manager?s income. Incentive contracts of sufficient yet modest convexity are shown to result in an indeterminate general ...
Conference Paper
For richer, for poorer: sovereign debt contracts in crisis
Working Paper
A dynamic model of unsecured credit
The author studies the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender is unable to observe the borrower's ability to repay a loan; (ii) the borrower cannot commit to any long-term contract; (iii) it is costly for the lender to contact a borrower and to walk away from a contract; and (iv) transactions within each credit relationship are not publicly observable. The lender's optimal contract has two key properties: delayed ...
Journal Article
Research spotlight: Ties that bind
Related links: https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/econ_focus/2011/q3/research_spotlight_weblinks.cfm
Working Paper
Debt and equity as optimal contracts
Using a principal-agent model in which an entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depend on his effort, which is not observable by the financier, the author shows that the optimal contract used to finance such a project can be replicated by a unique combination of debt and equity, proving the optimality of these financial instruments. ; A look at the evolution of the collection, clearinghouse, and regulatory provisions of the Federal Reserve Act. The Reserve Banks? check collection service was designed in 1913 to serve as "glue," attaching the new central bank to the commercial ...
Report
A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
There is now an extensive literature regarding the efficient design of incentive mechanisms in dynamic environments. In this literature, there are no exogenous links across time periods because either privately observed shocks are assumed time independent or past private actions have no influence on the realizations of current variables. The absence of exogenous links across time periods ensures that preferences over continuation contracts are common knowledge, making the definition of incentive compatible contracts at a point in time a simple matter. In this paper, we present general ...
Working Paper
Contracting innovations and the evolution of clearing and settlement methods at futures exchanges
Defining futures contracts as substitutes for associated cash transactions enables a discussion of the evolution of controls over contract nonperformance risk. These controls are incorporated into exchange methods for clearing contracts. Three clearing methods are discussed: direct, ringing and complete. The incidence and operation of each are described. Direct-clearing systems feature bilateral contracts with terms specified by the counterparties to the contract. Exchanges relying on direct clearing system chiefly serve as mediators in trade disputes. Ringing is shown to facilitate contract ...