Search Results
Report
Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry
We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks? unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation (1) decreases with the total leverage ratio and (2) increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider ...
Journal Article
Crosscurrents in 1986 bank performance
Journal Article
Capital ratios as predictors of bank failure
The current review of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord has put the spotlight on the ratios used to assess banks? capital adequacy. This article examines the effectiveness of three capital ratios?the first based on leverage, the second on gross revenues, and the third on risk-weighted assets?in forecasting bank failure over different time frames. Using 1988-93 data on U.S. banks, the authors find that the simple leverage and gross revenue ratios perform as well as the more complex risk-weighted ratio over one- or two-year horizons. Although the risk-weighted measures prove more accurate in ...
Journal Article
Commercial bank profits in 1993
Journal Article
Fair value accounting and regulatory capital requirements
This paper was presented at the conference "Financial services at the crossroads: capital regulation in the twenty-first century" as part of session 1, "Impact of capital requirements on bank risk taking: empirical evidence." The conference, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on February 26-27, 1998, was designed to encourage a consensus between the public and private sectors on an agenda for capital regulation in the new century.
Journal Article
A reconsideration of the risk sensitivity of U.S. banking organization subordinated debt spreads: a sample selection approach
The authors estimate a sample selection model over three distinct regulatory "regimes" when the treatment of bank bondholders (in the event of bank failures) differed substantially. They then estimate their selection model to test the strength of bond market discipline over these three regulatory regimes, finding that bank bond spreads are positively associated with bank risk measures during all three regimes, even during the too-big-to-fail period.
Speech
Regulatory reform of the global financial system
Remarks hosted by the Institute of Regulation & Risk North Asia, Hong Kong