Search Results
Journal Article
Regulations limit banks' choice of capital instruments
Journal Article
F.Y.I. commercial bank profitability: still weak in 1987
Report
Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry
We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks? unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation (1) decreases with the total leverage ratio and (2) increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider ...
Speech
U.S. experience with bank stress tests
Based on remarks at the Group of 30 plenary meeting, Bern, Switzerland.
Journal Article
Banking 1987: a year of reckoning
Journal Article
The choice of capital instruments
A system of bank supervision and regulation should protect taxpayers and the financial system without imposing unnecessary costs on banks. This article focuses on whether existing capital regulations, one of the primary tools of bank supervision and regulation, are imposing unnecessary costs on banks. In particular, the capital requirements may be requiring banks to issue equity when it would be less costly for them to issue subordinated debt. ; The authors obtain evidence on the costs generated by equity issues by examining the type of capital banks issued in response to the capital ...
Journal Article
Fair value accounting and regulatory capital requirements
This paper was presented at the conference "Financial services at the crossroads: capital regulation in the twenty-first century" as part of session 1, "Impact of capital requirements on bank risk taking: empirical evidence." The conference, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on February 26-27, 1998, was designed to encourage a consensus between the public and private sectors on an agenda for capital regulation in the new century.