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Keywords:Bank regulation 

Discussion Paper
The Effects of Post-Crisis Banking Reforms

The financial crisis of 2007-08 exposed many limitations of the regulatory architecture of the U.S. financial system. In an attempt to mitigate these limitations, there has been a wave of regulatory reforms in the post-crisis period, especially in the banking sector. These include tighter bank capital and liquidity rules; new resolution procedures for failed banks; the creation of a stand-alone consumer protection agency; greater transparency in money market funds; and a move to central clearing of derivatives, among other measures. As these reforms have been finalized and implemented, a ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20181001b

Working Paper
The Effect of Possible EU Diversification Requirements on the Risk of Banks’ Sovereign Bond Portfolios

Recent policy discussion includes the introduction of diversification requirements for sovereign bond portfolios of European banks. In this paper, we evaluate the possible effects of these constraints on risk and diversification in the sovereign bond portfolios of the major European banks. First, we capture the dependence structure of European countries? sovereign risks and identify the common factors driving European sovereign CDS spreads by means of an independent component analysis. We then analyze the risk and diversification in the sovereign bond portfolios of the largest European banks ...
Working Papers , Paper 19-12

Newsletter
A New Era of Community Banking

The 11th annual Community Bankers Symposium, cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), was held at the Chicago Fed on November 18, 2016. This article summarizes key presentations and discussions at the event.
Chicago Fed Letter

Working Paper
Disclosure of stress test results

Should regulatory bank examinations be made public? Regulators have argued that the confidentiality of the examination process promotes frank exchanges between bankers and examiners and that public disclosure of examination results could have a chilling effect. I examine the tradeoffs in a world in which examination results can be kept confidential, but regulatory interventions are observable by market participants, as they typically are for stress tests. Inducing banks to communicate truthfully requires regulators to engage in forbearance, which is priced into banks? uninsured debt and ...
Working Papers , Paper 15-31

Working Paper
Optimal Design of Contingent Capital

This paper proposes a parsimonious framework for designing contingent capital contracts (CoCos). CoCos designed this way (i) are either optimal or incentive compatible for equity holders, (ii) implement a unique equilibrium, and (iii) result in an optimal capital structure for the firm. We consider CoCos with equity conversion and write-down modalities. Equity conversion CoCos are optimal; write-down CoCos are incentive-compatible. Both types of CoCos can be implemented by exogenously specifying a capital ratio rule that triggers conversion and, hence, qualify as additional tier 1 (AT1) ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2024-051

Working Paper
Customer Liquidity Provision : Implications for Corporate Bond Transaction Costs

The convention in calculating trading costs in corporate bond markets is to assume that dealers provide liquidity to non-dealers (customers) and calculate average bid-ask spreads that customers pay dealers. We show that customers often provide liquidity in corporate bond markets, and thus, average bid-ask spreads underestimate trading costs that customers demanding liquidity pay. Compared with periods before the 2008 financial crisis, substantial amounts of liquidity provision have moved from the dealer sector to the non-dealer sector, consistent with decreased dealer risk capacity. Among ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-116

Report
Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks

Banks' ratio of the market value to book value of their equity was close to 1 until the 1990s, then more than doubled during the 1996-2007 period, and fell again to values close to 1 after the 2008 financial crisis. Sarin and Summers (2016) and Chousakos and Gorton (2017) argue that the drop in banks' market-to-book ratio since the crisis is due to a loss in bank franchise value or profitability. In this paper we argue that banks' market-to-book ratio is the sum of two components: franchise value and the value of government guarantees. We empirically decompose the ratio between these two ...
Staff Report , Paper 567

Journal Article
Reciprocal Deposits and the Banking Turmoil of 2023

Reciprocal deposits are deposits exchanged between banks to effectively increase deposit insurance coverage. Their use grew significantly during the banking turmoil of 2023. This Economic Commentary describes what they are, their connection to brokered deposits, how their legal treatment has changed over time, and which banks use them the most. It also discusses longer-run trends in uninsured deposits.
Economic Commentary , Volume 2024 , Issue 14 , Pages 12

Working Paper
Regulating Bank Portfolio Choice Under Asymmetric Information

Regulating bank risk-taking is challenging since banks know more than regulators about the risks of their portfolios and can make adjustments to game regulations. To address this problem, I build a tractable model that incorporates this information asymmetry. The model is flexible enough to encompass many regulatory tools, although I focus on taxes. These taxes could also be interpreted as reflecting the shadow costs of other regulations, such as capital requirements. I show that linear risk-sensitive taxes should not generally be set more conservatively to address asymmetric information. I ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2025-009

Working Paper
Bank Liquidity and Capital Regulation in General Equilibrium

We develop a nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking sector and use it to study the macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum liquidity standard for banks on top of existing capital adequacy requirements. The model generates a distribution of bank sizes arising from differences in banks' ability to generate revenue from loans and from occasionally binding capital and liquidity constraints. Under our baseline calibration, imposing a liquidity requirement would lead to a steady-state decrease of about 3 percent in the amount of loans made, an increase in banks' holdings ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2014-85

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