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Working Paper
Bank regulation under fire sale externalities
This paper examines the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations in a model characterized by fire sale externalities. In the model, banks can insure against potential liquidity shocks by hoarding sufficient precautionary liquid assets. However, it is never optimal to fully insure, so realized liquidity shocks trigger an asset fire sale. Banks, not internalizing the fire sale externality, overinvest in the risky asset and underinvest in the liquid asset in the unregulated competitive equilibrium. Capital requirements can lead to less severe fire sales by ...
Report
Evidence That Relaxing Dealers’ Risk Constraints Can Make the Treasury Market More Liquid
This brief studies how regulation involving bank capital requirements affects the behavior of bank-affiliated primary dealers in the Treasury market. Specifically, it looks at the potential effects of changes to the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) requirement, which determines how much capital a bank must hold in relation to its overall exposure, including exposure in its trading assets such as Treasuries. The SLR is a measure of a bank’s ability to absorb losses during periods of financial stress; the Federal Reserve sets a minimum requirement for the SLR to help protect the stability ...