Search Results
Working Paper
Divestiture as an antitrust remedy in bank mergers
The purpose of this study is to determine whether, from a public policy standpoint, divestitures constitute an effective antitrust remedy in bank merger cases. A number of findings emerge from the study: Divested branches have a remarkable survival record; structural changes effected by divestitures tend to persist over time; larger buyers of divested branches tended to be more successful than smaller buyers; divestiture of the target institutions' branches rather than those of applicants proved preferable from an antitrust standpoint; and divested branches selected by the Department of ...
Working Paper
Are there regimes of antitrust enforcement? An empirical analysis
In this paper, the authors propose a new index of antitrust enforcement. The index is compiled from quarterly data from the Department of Justice from 1890 to 1989 and is designed to reflect the relative influence of variables that have deterrent effects. The authors use Hamilton's (1989, 1990) regime-switching technique to estimate a model in which the enforcement index follows a regime-specific AR(1) process. The authors find evidence of long-lived regimes. The high enforcement regime, which lasted from about 1910 to the mid-1960s, produced enforcement that was, on average, almost twice as ...
Journal Article
Antitrust and payment technologies: commentary
Conference Paper
Should merger policy be changed? An antitrust perspective
Working Paper
A note on antitrust in a stochastic market
Journal Article
Antitrust and payment technologies: commentary
Journal Article
Antitrust policy and vertical mergers
Recently, federal regulators responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws have shown a renewed interest in the potential anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers--mergers between two independent firms in successive stages of production. This greater activism in vertical merger cases is in striking contrast to the permissive policies that prevailed throughout the 1980s, which, in turn, were a response to the Justice Department's and the Federal Trade Commission's open hostility to vertical mergers during the 1960s and 1970s.> The cyclical antitrust treatment of vertical mergers over the ...