Oil Curse, Economic Growth and Trade Openness
An important economic paradox that frequently arises in the economic literature is that countries with abundant natural resources are poor in terms of real gross domestic product per capita. This paradox, known as the ?resource curse,? is contrary to the conventional intuition that natural resources help to improve economic growth and prosperity. Using panel data for 95 countries, this study revisits the resource curse paradox in terms of oil resource abundance for the period 1980?2017. In addition, the study examines the role of trade openness in influencing the relationship between oil abundance and economic growth. The study finds that trade openness is a possible avenue to reduce the resource curse. Trade openness allows countries to obtain competitive prices for their resources in the international market and access advanced technologies to extract resources more efficiently. Therefore, natural resource?rich economies can reduce the resource curse by opening themselves to international trade.
AUTHORS: Vespignani, Joaquin L.; Raghavan, Mala; Majumder, Monoj Kumar
The U.S. oil supply revolution and the global economy
This paper investigates the global macroeconomic consequences of falling oil prices due to the oil revolution in the United States, using a Global VAR model estimated for 38 countries/regions over the period 1979Q2 to 2011Q2. Set-identification of the U.S. oil supply shock is achieved through imposing dynamic sign restrictions on the impulse responses of the model. The results show that there are considerable heterogeneities in the responses of different countries to a U.S. supply-driven oil price shock, with real GDP increasing in both advanced and emerging market oil-importing economies, output declining in commodity exporters, inflation falling in most countries, and equity prices rising worldwide. Overall, our results suggest that following the U.S. oil revolution, with oil prices falling by 51 percent in the first year, global growth increases by 0.16 to 0.37 percentage points. This is mainly due to an increase in spending by oil importing countries, which exceeds the decline in expenditure by oil exporters.
AUTHORS: Raissi, Mehdi; Mohaddes, Kamiar
Oil prices and the global economy: is it different this time around?
The recent plunge in oil prices has brought into question the generally accepted view that lower oil prices are good for the US and the global economy. In this paper, using a quarterly multi-country econometric model, we first show that a fall in oil prices tends relatively quickly to lower interest rates and inflation in most countries, and increase global real equity prices. The effects on real output are positive, although they take longer to materialize (around 4 quarters after the shock). We then re-examine the effects of low oil prices on the US economy over different sub-periods using monthly observations on real oil prices, real equity prices and real dividends. We confirm the perverse positive relationship between oil and equity prices over the period since the 2008 financial crisis highlighted in the recent literature, but show that this relationship has been unstable when considered over the longer time period of 1946-2016. In contrast, we find a stable negative relationship between oil prices and real dividends which we argue is a better proxy for economic activity (as compared to equity prices). On the supply side, the effects of lower oil prices differ widely across the different oil producers, and could be perverse initially, as some of the major oil producers try to compensate their loss of revenues by raising production. Taking demand and supply adjustments to oil price changes as a whole, we conclude that oil markets equilibrate but rather slowly, with large episodic swings between low and high oil prices.
AUTHORS: Pesaran, M. Hashem; Mohaddes, Kamiar
The impact of oil price shocks on the U.S. stock market: a note on the roles of U.S. and non-U.S. oil production
Kilian and Park (IER 50 (2009), 1267?1287) find shocks to oil supply are relatively unimportant to understanding changes in U.S. stock returns. We examine the impact of both U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks on stock returns in light of the unprecedented expansion in U.S. oil production since 2009. Our results underscore the importance of the disaggregation of world oil supply and of the recent extraordinary surge in the U.S. oil production for analysing impact on U.S. stock prices. We also show that stock returns respond very differently at the industrial level to non-U.S. and U.S. oil supply shocks.
AUTHORS: Vespignani, Joaquin L.; Kang, Wensheng; Ratti, Ronald A.
Fuel subsidies, the oil market and the world economy
This paper studies the e ffects of oil producing countries' fuel subsidies on the oil market and the world economy. We identify 24 oil producing countries with fuel subsidies where retail fuel prices are about 34 percent of the world price. We construct a two-country model where one country represents the oil-exporting subsidizers and the second the oil-importing bloc, and calibrate the model to match recent data. We find that the removal of subsidies would reduce the world price of oil by six percent. The removal of subsidies is unambiguously welfare enhancing for the oil-importing countries. Welfare can also improve in the oil-exporting countries, depending upon the extent to which they are net exporters of oil and on oil supply and demand elasticities.
AUTHORS: Balke, Nathan S.; Plante, Michael D.; Yucel, Mine K.
Industry Effects of Oil Price Shocks: Re-Examination
Sectoral responses to oil price shocks help determine how these shocks are transmitted through the economy. Textbook treatments of oil price shocks often emphasize negative supply effects on oil importing countries. By contrast, the seminal contribution of Lee and Ni (2002) has shown that almost all U.S. industries experience oil price shocks largely through a reduction in their respective demands. Only industries with very high oil intensities face a supply-driven reduction. In this paper, we re-examine this seminal findings using two additional decades of data. Further, we apply updated empirical methods, including structural factor-augmented vector autoregressions, that take into account how industries are linked among themselves and with the remainder of the macro-economy. Our results confirm the original finding of Lee and Ni that demand effects of oil price shocks dominate in all but a handful of U.S. industries.
AUTHORS: Jo, Soojin; Karnizova, Lilia; Reza, Abeer
Non-renewable resources, extraction technology, and endogenous growth
We document that global resource extraction has strongly increased with economic growth, while prices have exhibited stable trends for almost all major non-renewable resources from 1700 to 2018. Why have resources not become scarcer as suggested by standard economic theory? We develop a theory of extraction technology, geology and growth grounded in stylized facts. Rising resource demand incentivises firms to invest in new technology to increase their economically extractable reserves. Prices remain constant because increasing returns from the geological distribution of resources offset diminishing returns in innovation. As a result, the aggregate growth rate depends partly on the geological distribution of resources. For example, a greater average concentration of a resource in the Earth's crust leads to more resource extraction, a lower price and a higher growth rate on the balanced growth path. Our paper provides economic and geologic microfoundations explaining why flat resource prices and increasing production are reasonable assumptions in economic models of climate change.
AUTHORS: Stuermer, Martin; Schwerhoff, Gregor
The Propagation of Regional Shocks in Housing Markets: Evidence from Oil Price Shocks in Canada
Shocks to the demand for housing that originate in one region may seem important only for that regional housing market. We provide evidence that such shocks can also affect housing markets in other regions. Our analysis focuses on the response of Canadian housing markets to oil price shocks. Oil price shocks constitute an important source of exogenous regional variation in income in Canada because oil production is highly geographically concentrated. We document that, at the national level, real oil price shocks account for 11% of the variability in real house price growth over time. At the regional level, we find that unexpected increases in the real price of oil raise housing demand and real house prices not only in oil-producing regions, but also in other regions. We develop a theoretical model of the propagation of real oil price shocks across regions that helps understand this finding. The model differentiates between oil-producing and non-oil-producing regions and incorporates multiple sectors, trade between provinces, government redistribution, and consumer spending on fuel. We empirically confirm the model prediction that oil price shocks are propagated to housing markets in non-oil-producing regions by the government redistribution of oil revenue and by increased interprovincial trade.
AUTHORS: Kilian, Lutz; Zhou, Xiaoqing
Refining the Workhorse Oil Market Model
The Kilian and Murphy (2014) structural vector autoregressive model has become the workhorse model for the analysis of oil markets. I explore various refinements and extensions of this model, including the effects of (1) correcting an error in the measure of global real economic activity, (2) explicitly incorporating narrative sign restrictions into the estimation, (3) relaxing the upper bound on the impact price elasticity of oil supply, (4) evaluating the implied posterior distribution of the structural models, and (5) extending the sample. I demonstrate that the substantive conclusions of Kilian and Murphy (2014) are largely unaffected by these changes.
AUTHORS: Zhou, Xiaoqing
The U.S. Shale Oil Boom, the Oil Export Ban, and the Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis
This paper examines the effects of the U.S. shale oil boom in a two-country DSGE model where countries produce crude oil, refined oil products, and a non-oil good. The model incorporates different types of crude oil that are imperfect substitutes for each other as inputs into the refining sector. The model is calibrated to match oil market and macroeconomic data for the U.S. and the rest of the world (ROW). We investigate the implications of a significant increase in U.S. light crude oil production similar to the shale oil boom. Consistent with the data, our model predicts that light oil prices decline, U.S. imports of light oil fall dramatically, and light oil crowds out the use of medium crude by U.S. refiners. In addition, fuel prices fall and U.S. GDP rises. We then use our model to examine the potential implications of the former U.S. crude oil export ban. The model predicts that the ban was a binding constraint in 2013 through 2015. We find that the distortions introduced by the policy are greatest in the refining sector. Light oil prices become artificially low in the U.S., and U.S. refineries produce inefficiently high amount of refined products, but the impact on refined product prices and GDP are negligible.
AUTHORS: Cakir Melek, Nida; Plante, Michael D.; Yucel, Mine K.