Search Results
Discussion Paper
Central Banks, Global Shocks, and Local Crises: Lessons from the Atlanta Fed's Response to the 1920–21 Recession
During late 1920, the president (then called "governor") and board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta were confronted with an unexpected, devastating collapse in the price of a commodity whose global production was concentrated in their district—cotton. Their judgment was that the fall in cotton prices was temporary and that its effects could be lessened with generous credit policies that did not conflict with the Federal Reserve Act. Other officials within the Federal Reserve System did not agree with this judgment, however, leading to a contentious policy debate and an ...
Working Paper
Navigating Constraints: The Evolution of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1935-59
The 1950s are often pointed to as a decade in which the Federal Reserve operated a particularly successful monetary policy. The present paper examines the evolution of Federal Reserve monetary policy from the mid-1930s through the 1950s in an effort to understand better the apparent success of policy in the 1950s. Whereas others have debated whether the Fed had a sophisticated understanding of how to implement policy, our focus is on how the constraints on the Fed changed over time. Roosevelt Administration gold policies and New Deal legislation limited the Fed's ability to conduct an ...
Working Paper
Navigating constraints: the evolution of Federal Reserve monetary policy, 1935-59
The 1950s are often cited as a decade in which the Federal Reserve operated a particularly successful monetary policy. The present paper examines the evolution of Federal Reserve monetary policy from the mid-1930s through the 1950s in an effort to understand better the apparent success of policy in the 1950s. Whereas others have debated whether the Fed had a sophisticated understanding of how to implement policy, our focus is on how the constraints on the Fed changed over time. Roosevelt Administration gold policies and New Deal legislation limited the Fed?s ability to conduct an independent ...
Working Paper
What drives the shadow banking system in the short and long run?
This paper analyzes how risk and other factors altered the relative use of short-term business debt funded by the shadow banking system since the early 1960s. Results indicate that the share was affected over the long-run not only by changing information and reserve requirement costs, but also by shifts in the impact of regulations on bank versus nonbank credit sources?such as Basel I in 1990 and reregulation in 2010. In the short-run, the shadow share rose when deposit interest rate ceilings were binding, the economic outlook improved, or risk premia declined, and fell when event risks ...
Journal Article
Central Banks, Global Shocks, and Local Crises: Lessons from the Atlanta Fed's Response to the 1920–21 Recession
During late 1920, the president (then called "governor") and board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta were confronted with an unexpected, devastating collapse in the price of a commodity whose global production was concentrated in their district—cotton. Their judgment was that the fall in cotton prices was temporary and that its effects could be lessened with generous credit policies that did not conflict with the Federal Reserve Act. Other officials within the Federal Reserve System did not agree with this judgment, however, leading to a contentious policy debate and an ...
Journal Article
Allan Meltzer and the Search for a Nominal Anchor
The author examines Allan Meltzer?s career in terms of the search of a nominal anchor for the U.S. Inflation targeting has provided a nominal anchor, in line with Meltzer?s view of inflation as a monetary phenomenon.
Working Paper
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the 1937-38 Recession? New Evidence on the Impact of Reserve Requirements on Bank Reserve Demand and Lending
In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks' reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937-38. Using a new database on individual banks, we show that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks' reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.
Journal Article
When Tight Is Too Tight: The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Post-World War II Spike in Inflation
With the end of World War II, the massive expansion of defense spending came to a halt, and the money supply financing it quickly stabilized. However, the real money supply declined further with the transitory inflationary upswing of 1946–47, which fueled deflationary expectations, passively pushing up real interest rates and triggering the 1949 recession. We compare the Fed’s current stance to this historical episode, concluding that the ongoing tightening is already sufficient to normalize monetary conditions to prepandemic trends. This article also discusses how fiscal policy might ...
Working Paper
The Anatomy of Single-Digit Inflation in the 1960s
Recently, the experience of the 1960s—when the U.S. inflation rate rose rapidly and persistently over a comparatively short period—has been invoked as a cautionary tale for the present. An analysis of this period indicates that the inflation regime that prevailed in the 1960s was different in several key regards from the one that prevailed on the eve of the pandemic. Hence, there are few useable lessons to be drawn from this experience, save that monetary policymaking remains a difficult undertaking.