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Jel Classification:J44 

Working Paper
Allocating Effort and Talent in Professional Labor Markets

In many professional service firms, new associates work long hours while competing in up-or-out promotion contests. Our model explores why these firms require young professionals to take on heavy work loads while simultaneously facing significant risks of dismissal. We argue that the productivity of skilled partners in professional service firms (e.g. law, consulting, investment banking and public accounting) is quite large relative to the productivity of their peers who are competent and experienced but not well-suited to the partner role. Therefore, these firms adopt personnel policies that ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2016-3

Working Paper
Foreign nurse importation to the United States and the supply of native registered nurses

Importing foreign nurses has been used as a strategy to ease nursing shortages in the United States. The effectiveness of this policy critically depends on the long-run response of native-born nurses. We examine how the immigration of foreign-born registered nurses (RNs) affects the occupational choice and long-run employment decisions of native RNs. Using a variety of empirical strategies that exploit the geographical distribution of immigrant nurses across U.S. cities, we find evidence of large displacement effects?over a 10-year period, for every foreign nurse that migrates to a city, ...
Working Papers , Paper 14-7

Working Paper
Interlocked Executives and Insider Board Members: An Empirical Analysis

This paper asked the question of whether the behavior and compensation of interlocked executives and non-independent board of directors are consistent with the hypothesis of governance problem or whether this problem is mitigated by implicit and market incentives. It then analyzes the role of independent board of directors. Empirically, we cannot reject the hypothesis that executives in companies with a large number of non-independent directors on the board receive the same expected compensation as other executives. In our model, every executive has an incentive to work. Placing more of ...
Working Papers , Paper 2015-40

Report
Analyzing the Labor Market Outcomes of Occupational Licensing

Recent assessments of occupational licensing have shown varying effects of the institution on labor market outcomes. This study revisits the relationship between occupational licensing and labor market outcomes by analyzing a new topical module to the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Relative to previously available data, the topical module offers more detailed information on occupational licensing from government, with a larger sample size and access to a richer set of person-level characteristics. We exploit this larger and more detailed data set to examine the labor ...
Staff Report , Paper 504

Report
Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to Interstate Migration?

Occupational licensure, one of the most significant labor market regulations in the United States, may restrict the interstate movement of workers. We analyze the interstate migration of 22 licensed occupations. Using an empirical strategy that controls for unobservable characteristics that drive long-distance moves, we find that the between-state migration rate for individuals in occupations with state-specific licensing exam requirements is 36 percent lower relative to members of other occupations. Members of licensed occupations with national licensing exams show no evidence of limited ...
Staff Report , Paper 561

Report
A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in U.S. States

We assess the welfare consequences of occupational licensing for workers and consumers. We estimate a model of labor market equilibrium in which licensing restricts labor supply but also affects labor demand via worker quality and selection. On the margin of occupations licensed differently between U.S. states, we find that licensing raises wages and hours but reduces employment. We estimate an average welfare loss of 12 percent of occupational surplus. Workers and consumers respectively bear 70 and 30 percent of the incidence. Higher willingness to pay offsets 80 percent of higher prices for ...
Staff Report , Paper 590

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