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Working Paper
Information Production, Misconduct Effort, and the Duration of Corporate Fraud
We develop and test a model linking the duration of financial fraud to information produced by auditors and analysts and efforts by managers to conceal the fraud. Our empirical results suggest fraud termination is more likely in the quarter following the release of audited financial statements, especially when reports contain explanatory language, indicating auditors? observable signals reduce fraud duration. Analyst attention increases the likelihood of fraud termination, but the marginal effect beyond the first analyst is negative, possibly due to free riding and herding behavior impairing analysts? ability to illuminate misconduct. Finally, evidence suggests managerial concealment significantly increases fraud duration.
AUTHORS: Nilsson, Mattias; Black, Jonathan; da Silva, Maximiliano; Pinheiro, Roberto
DATE: 2016-06-01

Working Paper
The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers
We find that stricter merger control legislation increases abnormal announcement returns of targets in bank mergers by 7 percentage points. Analyzing potential explanations for this result, we document an increase in the pre-merger profitability of targets, a decrease in the size of acquirers, and a decreasing share of transactions in which banks are acquired by other banks. Other merger properties, including the size and risk profile of targets, the geographic overlap of merging banks, and the stock market response of rivals appear unaffected. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of merger control leads to more efficient and more competitive transactions.
AUTHORS: Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Carletti, Elena; Ongena, Steven; Siedlarek, Jan-Peter
DATE: 2016-06-01

Working Paper
The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers
We find that stricter merger control legislation increases abnormal announcement returns of targets in bank mergers by 7 percentage points. Analyzing potential explanations for this result, we document an increase in the pre-merger profitability of targets, a decrease in the size of acquirers, and a decreasing share of transactions in which banks are acquired by other banks. Other merger properties, including the size and risk profile of targets, the geographic overlap of merging banks, and the stock market response of rivals appear unaffected. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of merger control leads to more efficient and more competitive transactions.
AUTHORS: Ongena, Steven; Carletti, Elena; Siedlarek, Jan-Peter; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
DATE: 2017-07-19

Working Paper
The Impact of Stricter Merger Control on Bank Mergers and Acquisitions. Too-Big-To-Fail and Competition
The effect of regulations on the banking sector is a key question for financial intermediation. This paper provides evidence that merger control regulation, although not directly targeted at the banking sector, has substantial economic effects on bank mergers. Based on an extensive sample of European countries, we show that target announcement premia increased by up to 16 percentage points for mergers involving control shifts after changes in merger legislation, consistent with a market expectation of increased profitability. These effects go hand-in-hand with a reduction in the propensity for mergers to create banks that are too-big-to-fail in their country.
AUTHORS: Ongena, Steven; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Carletti, Elena; Siedlarek, Jan-Peter
DATE: 2019-07-05

Working Paper
Information Production, Misconduct Effort, and the Duration of Financial Misrepresentation
We examine the link between information produced by auditors and analysts and fraud duration. Using a hazard model, we analyze misstatement periods related to SEC accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) between 1982 and 2012. Results suggest that misconduct is more likely to end just after firms announce an auditor switch or issue audited financial statements, particularly when the audit report contains explanatory language. Analyst following increases the fraud termination hazard. However, increases (decreases) in analyst coverage have a negative (positive) marginal impact on the termination hazard, suggesting that analysts signal whistleblowers with their choice to add or drop coverage. Finally, our results suggest that misconduct lasts longer when it is well planned, more complex, or involves more accrual manipulation. Taken together, our findings are consistent with auditors and analysts playing a key informational role in fraud detection, while managerial effort to conceal misconduct significantly extends its duration.
AUTHORS: da Silva, Maximiliano; Pinheiro, Roberto; Nilsson, Mattias; Black, Jonathan
DATE: 2016-06-01

Working Paper
Causal Impact of Risk Oversight Functions on Bank Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Our goal is to document the causal impact of having a board-level risk committee (RC) and a management-level executive designated as chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk. The Dodd Frank Act requires bank holding companies with over $10 billion of assets to have an RC, while those with over $50 billion of assets are additionally required to have a CRO to oversee risk management. The innovation that allows us to document a causal impact is our research design. First, we use the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment that forced noncompliant firms to adopt an RC and appoint a CRO. We adopt the difference-in-difference approach to estimate the change in risk following RC and CRO adoption. Second, we use the regression discontinuity approach centered on the $10 billion and $50 billion thresholds whereby firms that were just below the threshold were not required by the law to install an RC and to recruit a CRO, while those just above the thresholds had to comply with the regulation. Our contribution is to document that neither the RC nor the CRO have a causal impact on risk near these thresholds. However, we do find strong evidence of risk reduction following the passage of the law.
AUTHORS: Daniel, Naveen; Naveen, Lalitha; Haubrich, Joseph G.; Balasubramanyan, Lakshmi
DATE: 2019-01-10

Working Paper
Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry
Institutional investors often own significant equity in firms that compete in the same product market. These "common owners" may have an incentive to coordinate the actions of firms that would otherwise be competing rivals, leading to anti-competitive pricing. This paper uses data on airline ticket prices to test whether common owners induce anti-competitive pricing behavior. We find little evidence to support such a hypothesis, and show that the positive relationship between average ticket prices and a commonly used measure of common ownership previously documented in the literature is generated by the endogenous market share component, rather than the ownership component, of the measure.
AUTHORS: Dennis, Patrick; Gerardi, Kristopher S.; Schenone, Carola
DATE: 2019-07-01

Working Paper
Why does the FDIC sue?
Cases the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursues against the directors and officers of failed commercial banks for (gross) negligence are important for the corporate governance of U.S. commercial banks. These cases shape the kernel of bank corporate governance, as they guide expectations of bankers and regulators in defining the limits of acceptable behavior under financial distress. We examine the differences in behavior of all 408 U.S. commercial banks that were taken into receivership between 2007?2012. Sued banks had different balance sheet dynamics in the three years prior to failure. These banks were generally larger, faster growing, obtained riskier funding and were more ?optimistic?. We find evidence that the behavior of bank boards adjusts in an out-of-sample set of banks. Our results suggest the FDIC does not only pursue ?deep pockets?, but sets corporate governance standards for all banks by suing negligent directors and officers.
AUTHORS: Koch, Christoffer; Okamura, Ken
DATE: 2016-01-25

Working Paper
The Impact of Reserves Practices on Bank Opacity
Using a banking firm?s unexpected loan loss provision to proxy for earnings management, it is found to have a significantly positive effect on bank opacity. The explanatory power of earnings management on bank opacity is stronger during the pre-crisis period than during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. When we examine the effects of delays in loan loss recognition on bank opacity, we found strong statistical relations during the financial crisis period, while the results for the pre-crisis period are mixed. We conclude that bank opacity is related to unexpected loan loss provision as well as delays in loan loss recognition.
AUTHORS: Kwan, Simon H.; Iannotta, Giuliano
DATE: 2013

Working Paper
Reputation and Investor Activism
We show that an activist's reputation is a critical determinant of the success of their campaigns. We model reputation as target managers' belief about the activist's willingness to initiate a proxy fight. Our model indicates reputation, rather than stake size, induces managers to settle without a proxy fight. We present empirical evidence supporting our model's predictions: target companies more-frequently increase payouts, change management or board composition, engage in a merger or acquisition, or otherwise reorganize in response to high reputation activist campaigns, while target actions are not sensitive to the activist's stake size.
AUTHORS: Johnson, Travis L.; Swem, Nathan
DATE: 2017-02

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