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Jel Classification:G28 

Discussion Paper
Why Do Banks Target ROE?

Nonfinancial corporations focus on the growth in earnings per share (EPS) to benchmark their performance. Banks used to follow a similar practice, but starting in the late 1970s they began to emphasize return on equity (ROE) instead. In this blog post, we outline findings from our recent staff report, which argues that banks had an incentive to make this change when their charter values eroded owing to increased competition, and the incentive to change was magnified by risk-insensitive deposit insurance.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20181010

Discussion Paper
How Does Supervision Affect Bank Performance during Downturns?

Supervision and regulation are critical tools for the promotion of stability and soundness in the financial sector. In a prior post, we discussed findings from our recent research paper which examines the impact of supervision on bank performance (see earlier post How Does Supervision Affect Banks?). As described in that post, we exploit new supervisory data and develop a novel strategy to estimate the impact of supervision on bank risk taking, earnings, and growth. We find that bank holding companies (BHCs or “banks”) that receive more supervisory attention have less risky loan ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20200408

Speech
Compliance – some thoughts about reaching the next level

Remarks at the Fordham Journal of Corporate Counsel & Financial Law Symposium, Fordham Law School, New York City.
Speech , Paper 156

Speech
Operating global, acting local

Remarks at Institute of International Bankers Seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory/Examinations Compliance Issues, New York City.
Speech , Paper 146

Speech
Testimony on improving financial institution supervision: examining and addressing regulatory capture

Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection Subcommittee.
Speech , Paper 152

Speech
Reform in a time of rapid change

Remarks at the Standard and Poor's Ratings Services Global Bank Conference, New York City
Speech , Paper 134

Report
Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer--that is, maximize put option value--by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing charter value. Focusing on the relationship between book value, market value, and a risk measure, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at which put option value starts to dominate charter value. From these estimates, we infer the extent to which the ...
Staff Reports , Paper 138

Report
Bank Liquidity Creation, Systemic Risk, and Basel Liquidity Regulations

We find that banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR banks) create less liquidity per dollar of assets in the post-LCR period than non-LCR banks by, in part, lending less. However, we also find that LCR banks are more resilient as they contribute less to fire-sale risk, relative to non-LCR banks. We estimate the net after-tax benefits from reduced lending and fire-sale risk to be about 1.4 percent of assets in 2013:Q2-2014 for large banks. Our findings, which we show are unlikely to result from capital regulations, highlight the trade-off between lower liquidity creation and ...
Staff Reports , Paper 852

Report
Liquidity policies and systemic risk

The growth of wholesale-funded credit intermediation has motivated liquidity regulations. We analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which liquidity and capital regulations interact with the supply of risk-free assets. In the model, the endogenously time-varying tightness of liquidity and capital constraints generates intermediaries? leverage cycle, influencing the pricing of risk and the level of risk in the economy. Our analysis focuses on liquidity policies? implications for household welfare. Within the context of our model, liquidity requirements are preferable to ...
Staff Reports , Paper 661

Report
Supervising large, complex financial companies: what do supervisors do?

The Federal Reserve is responsible for the prudential supervision of bank holding companies (BHCs) on a consolidated basis. Prudential supervision involves monitoring and oversight to assess whether these firms are engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, as well as ensuring that firms are taking corrective actions to address such practices. Prudential supervision is interlinked with, but distinct from, regulation, which involves the development and promulgation of the rules under which BHCs and other regulated financial intermediaries operate. This paper describes the Federal Reserve?s ...
Staff Reports , Paper 729

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