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Jel Classification:G28 

Working Paper
Banks, Non Banks, and Lending Standards

We study how competition between banks and non-banks affects lending standards. Banks have private information about some borrowers and are subject to capital requirements to mitigate risk-taking incentives from deposit insurance. Non-banks are uninformed and market forces determine their capital structure. We show that lending standards monotonically increase in bank capital requirements. Intuitively, higher capital requirements raise banks’ skin in the game and screening out bad projects assures positive expected lending returns. Non-banks enter the market when capital requirements are ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-086

Report
Alternative Trading Systems in the Corporate Bond Market

We investigate the trading of corporate bonds on alternative trading system (ATS) platforms. We draw a key distinction between request-for-quote (RFQ) and electronic communication network (ECN) trading protocols, which balance investors’ preference for immediacy and anonymity. Trades on ATS platforms are smaller and more likely to involve investment-grade bonds. Trades on ATS platforms are more probable for older, less actively traded bonds from smaller issues and for bonds traded by more dealers where inventory is high. Moreover, dealer participation on ATS platforms is associated with ...
Staff Reports , Paper 938

Working Paper
The (Unintended?) Consequences of the Largest Liquidity Injection Ever

The design of lender-of-last-resort interventions can exacerbate the bank-sovereign nexus. During sovereign crises, central bank provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes banks to purchase high yield eligible collateral securities matching the maturity of the central bank loans. Using unique security level data, we find that the European Central Bank's 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation caused Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds, equivalent to 10.6% of amounts outstanding, and pledge them to obtain central bank liquidity. The steepening of Eurozone ...
Working Papers , Paper 2017-039

Journal Article
The (Unintended?) Consequences of the Largest Liquidity Injection Ever

The design of lender-of-last-resort interventions can exacerbate the bank-sovereign nexus. During sovereign crises, central bank provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes banks to purchase high yield eligible collateral securities matching the maturity of the central bank loans. Using unique security level data, we find that the European Central Bank's 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation caused Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds, equivalent to 10.6% of amounts outstanding, and pledge them to obtain central bank liquidity. The steepening of Eurozone ...
Working Papers , Volume 112 , Pages 97-112

Journal Article
A Short Tour of Global Risks

This article is based on the author's Homer Jones Memorial Lecture delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Wednesday, June 25, 2019.
Review , Volume 102 , Issue 3 , Pages 221-235

Journal Article
Strategic Review and Beyond: Rethinking Monetary Policy and Independence

I survey monetary policy strategy, regulation, and central banks’ mandates and independence. I do not think strongly negative interest rates, vastly expanded quantitative easing, or extensive forward guidance can or should stimulate in the next recession.
Review , Volume 102 , Issue 2 , Pages 99-119

Journal Article
Corporate culture in banking

Until recently, regulatory discourse has paid scant attention to the issue of organizational culture in banking. Yet ethical lapses and systematic weaknesses exposed in the 2007-09 financial crisis suggest that future policy dialogue is unlikely to ignore culture?s significance. Drawing from an approach developed in organizational behavior research, the author introduces a framework for diagnosing and changing corporate culture in a way that more effectively supports the bank?s growth strategy and induces behavior that enhances financial stability. The normative exercise, highlighting the ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Aug , Pages 5-16

Journal Article
Stability of funding models: an analytical framework

With the recent financial crisis, many financial intermediaries experienced strains created by declining asset values and a loss of funding sources. In reviewing these stress events, one notices that some arrangements appear to have been more stable?that is, better able to withstand shocks to their asset values and/or funding sources?than others. Because the precise determinants of this stability are not well understood, gaining a better grasp of them is a critical task for market participants and policymakers as they try to design more resilient arrangements and improve financial regulation. ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Feb , Pages 29-47

Journal Article
Credit risk transfer and de facto GSE reform

The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac credit risk transfer (CRT) programs, now in their fifth year, shift a portion of credit risk on more than $1.8 trillion of mortgages to private-sector investors. This study summarizes and evaluates the CRT programs, finding that they have been successful in reducing the exposure of the government-sponsored enterprises and the federal government to mortgage credit risk without disrupting the liquidity or stability of mortgage secondary markets. The programs have also created a new financial market for pricing and trading mortgage credit risk, which has grown in ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue 24-3 , Pages 88-116

Working Paper
Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements and Implementable Capital Buffer Rules

We build a quantitatively relevant macroeconomic model with endogenous risk-taking. In our model, deposit insurance and limited liability can lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. This excessive risk-taking can be triggered by aggregate or sectoral shocks that reduce the return on safer loans. Excessive risk-taking can be avoided by raising bank capital requirements, but unnecessarily tight requirements lower welfare by limiting liquidity producing bank deposits. Consequently, optimal capital requirements are dynamic (or state contingent). We provide examples in which ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-056

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