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Jel Classification:F30 

Speech
Global financial stability - the road ahead

Remarks at the Tenth Asia-Pacific High Level Meeting on Banking Supervision, Auckland, New Zealand
Speech , Paper 130

Speech
Remarks at the CPMI’s 25th Anniversary Conference

Remarks at the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure?s 25th Anniversary Conference, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.
Speech , Paper 175

Speech
U.S. macroeconomic and regulatory developments and emerging market economies

Remarks at the International Financial Conference Annual Meeting, Cartagena, Colombia.
Speech , Paper 159

Report
Aggregation and the PPP puzzle in a sticky-price model

We study the purchasing power parity (PPP) puzzle in a multisector, two-country, sticky-price model. Firms' price stickiness differs across sectors, in accordance with recent microeconomic evidence on price setting in various countries. Combined with local currency pricing, these differences lead sectoral real exchange rates to exhibit heterogeneous dynamics. We show that in this economy, deviations of the real exchange rate from PPP are more volatile and persistent when compared with a counterfactual one-sector world economy that features the same average frequency of price changes and is ...
Staff Reports , Paper 351

Report
What determines the composition of international bank flows?

Several recent studies document that the extent to which banks transmit shocks across borders depends on the type of foreign activities these banks engage in. This paper proposes a model to explain the composition of banks? foreign activities, distinguishing between international interbank lending, intrabank lending, and cross-border lending to foreign firms. The model shows that the different activities are jointly determined and depend on the efficiencies of countries? banking sectors, differences in the return on loans across countries, and impediments to foreign bank operations. ...
Staff Reports , Paper 681

Report
Rational speculators and exchange rate volatility

This paper examines whether rational, fully informed speculators will smooth exchange rates. Friedman's (1953) claim that they must do so is challenged, based on the exclusion of interest rate differentials from his interpretation of speculator behavior. Once one recognizes that interest rates matter to speculators, it becomes apparent that rational speculators could sometimes violate Friedman's description of their behavior, and buy currency when its value is relatively high or sell currency when its value is low. For this reason the presence of rational, fully informed speculators may ...
Staff Reports , Paper 13

Report
A bargaining theory of trade invoicing and pricing

We develop a theoretical model of international trade pricing in which individual exporters and importers bargain over the transaction price and exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. We find that the choice of price and invoicing currency reflects the full market structure, including the extent of fragmentation and the degree of heterogeneity across importers and across exporters. Our study shows that a party has a higher effective bargaining weight when it is large or more risk tolerant. A higher effective bargaining weight of importers relative to exporters in turn translates into lower ...
Staff Reports , Paper 611

Report
Risk appetite and exchange Rates

We present evidence that the growth of U.S.-dollar-denominated banking sector liabilities forecasts appreciations of the U.S. dollar, both in-sample and out-of-sample, against a large set of foreign currencies. We provide a theoretical foundation for a funding liquidity channel in a global banking model where exchange rates fluctuate as a function of banks? balance sheet capacity. We estimate prices of risk using a cross-sectional asset pricing approach and show that the U.S. dollar funding liquidity forecasts exchange rates because of its association with time-varying risk premia. Our ...
Staff Reports , Paper 361

Report
Coordination and Crisis in Monetary Unions

We study fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets. Member-country fiscal authorities lack commitment to repay their debt and choose fiscal policy independently. A common monetary authority chooses inflation for the union, also without commitment. We first describe the existence of a fiscal externality that arises in the presence of limited commitment and leads countries to over-borrow; this externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union. We then investigate the impact of the composition of ...
Staff Report , Paper 511

Working Paper
The Stock of External Sovereign Debt: Can We Take the Data at ‘Face Value’?

The stock of sovereign debt is typically measured at face value. Defined as the undiscounted sum of future principal repayments, face values are misleading when debts are issued with different contractual forms or maturities. In this paper, we construct alternative measures of the stock of external sovereign debt for 100 developing countries from 1979 through 2006 that correct for differences in contractual form and maturity. We show that our alternative measures: (1) paint a very different quantitative, and in some cases also qualitative, picture of the stock of developing country external ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2014-5

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