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Jel Classification:D82 

Report
Who Sees the Trades? The Effect of Information on Liquidity in Inter-Dealer Markets

Dealers, who strategically supply liquidity to traders, are subject to both liquidity and adverse selection costs. While liquidity costs can be mitigated through inter-dealer trading, individual dealers? private motives to acquire information compromise inter-dealer market liquidity. Post-trade information disclosure can improve market liquidity by counteracting dealers? incentives to become better informed through their market-making activities. Asymmetric disclosure, however, exacerbates the adverse selection problem in inter-dealer markets, in turn decreasing equilibrium liquidity ...
Staff Reports , Paper 892

Report
Defining and detecting predatory lending

Staff Report no. 273 has been removed at the request of the author. See links to related papers.
Staff Reports , Paper 273

Working Paper
Nonlinear Pricing in Village Economies

This paper examines the price of basic staples in rural Mexico. We document that nonlinear pricing in the form of quantity discounts is common, that quantity discounts are sizable for typical staples, and that the well-known conditional cash transfer program Progresa has significantly increased quantity discounts, although the program, as documented in previous studies, has not affected on average unit prices. To account for these patterns, we propose a model of price discrimination that nests those of Maskin and Riley (1984) and Jullien (2000), in which consumers differ in their tastes and, ...
Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers , Paper 23

Working Paper
Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market

Just as employers face uncertainty when hiring workers, workers also face uncertainty when accepting employment, and bad employers may opportunistically depart from expectations, norms, and laws. However, prior research in economics and information sciences has focused sharply on the employer?s problem of identifying good workers rather than vice versa. This issue is especially pronounced in markets for gig work, including online labor markets, where platforms are developing strategies to help workers identify good employers. We build a theoretical model for the value of such reputation ...
Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers , Paper 16

Working Paper
Individual and Aggregate Constrained Efficient Intertemporal Wedges in Dynamic Mirrleesian Economies

Assuming a neoclassical production technology, this paper characterizes constrained efficient intertemporal wedges for the macro aggregate as well as the micro individual allocation of dynamic Mirrleesian economies. We first construct ?Pareto-Negishi weights? from the multipliers on a sequence of temporary incentive constraints. For a fairly general stochastic process of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, we show that the evolution of the Pareto-Negishi weight associated with agents? consumption is a nonnegative martingale. This powerful property enables us to deliver three contributions to ...
Working Papers , Paper 2015-43

Working Paper
Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information

We study optimal insurance contracts for an agent with Markovian private information. Our main results characterize the implications of constrained efficiency for long-run welfare and inequality. Under minimal technical conditions, there is Absolute Immiseration: in the long run, the agent?s consumption and utility converge to their lower bounds. When types are persistent and utility is unbounded below, there is Relative Immiseration: low-type agents are immiserated at a faster rate than high-type agents, and ?pathwise welfare inequality? grows without bound. These results extend and ...
Working Papers , Paper 2018-20

Working Paper
Investment and Bilateral Insurance

Private information may limit insurance possibilities when two agents get together to pool idiosyncratic risk. However, if there is capital accumulation, bilateral insurance possibilities may improve because misreporting distorts investment. We show that if one of the Pareto weights is sufficiently large, that agent does not have incentives to misreport. This implies that, under some conditions, the full information allocation is incentive compatible when agents have equal Pareto weights. In the long run, either one of the agents goes to immiseration, or both agents’ lifetime utilities are ...
Working Papers , Paper 2013-001

Working Paper
Designing Unemployment Insurance for Developing Countries

The benefits of implementing Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs) are studied in the presence of the multiple sources of information frictions often existing in developing countries. A benchmark incomplete markets economy is calibrated to Mexico in the early 2000s. The unconstrained optimal allocation would imply very large welfare gains relative to the benchmark economy (similar to an increase in consumption of 23% in every period). More importantly, in presence of multiple sources of information frictions, about half of those potential gains can be accrued through the ...
Working Papers , Paper 2018-6

Working Paper
Preventing bank runs

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as providing a formal rationale for the existence of bank-run equilibria. It has never been clear, however, whether bank-run equilibria in this framework are a natural byproduct of the economic environment or an artifact of suboptimal contractual arrangements. In the class of direct mechanisms, Peck and Shell (2003) demonstrate that bank-run equilibria can exist under an optimal contractual arrangement. The difficulty of preventing runs within this class of mechanism is that banks cannot identify whether withdrawals are being driven by ...
Working Papers , Paper 2014-21

Working Paper
REGULATING A MODEL

REVISED: 5/2018: We study a situation in which a regulator relies on models produced by banks in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but, in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank's private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low (e.g., when the bank has a very little or very large amount of debt). When ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-31

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Espino, Emilio 6 items

Sanchez, Juan M. 6 items

Sultanum, Bruno 6 items

Bethune, Zachary 3 items

Drozd, Lukasz A. 3 items

Kozlowski, Julian 3 items

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D86 17 items

G21 15 items

D83 8 items

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E58 7 items

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Adverse selection 8 items

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asymmetric information 6 items

liquidity 5 items

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