Search Results
Working Paper
Attention and a Paradox of Uncertainty
I show that macroeconomic uncertainty during recessions can arise from people paying more attention to aggregate events. When information is dispersed, people's attempts to acquire more information can lead to higher aggregate volatility, forecast dispersion, and uncertainty about aggregate output. Information rigidity is reduced, consistent with evidence in forecast surveys, and distinct from the prediction of exogenous volatility shocks. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, endogenous attention accounts for half of the observed fluctuations in volatility, forecast dispersion, and ...
Working Paper
Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning
We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance but also increases the agent's information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect. We characterize the optimal contract using the dynamic programming technique in which information rent is the unique state variable. In the optimal contract, the optimal effort is front-loaded and decreases stochastically over time. Furthermore, the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in ...
Working Paper
The Effect of Safe Assets on Financial Fragility in a Bank-Run Model
Risk-averse investors induce competitive intermediaries to hold safe assets, thereby lowering the probability of a run and reducing financial fragility. We revisit Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), who obtain a unique equilibrium in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) by introducing risky investment and noisy private signals. We show that, in the optimal demand-deposit contract subject to sequential service, banks hold safe assets to insure investors against investment risk. Consequently, fewer investors withdraw prematurely, which reduces the probability of a bank run. Safe asset ...
Discussion Paper
How Much Is Priced In? Market Expectations for FOMC Rate Hikes from Different Angles
It is essential for policymakers and financial market participants to understand market expectations for the path of future policy rates because these expectations can have important implications for financial markets and the broader economy. In this post?which is meant to complement prior Liberty Street Economics posts, including Crump et al. (2014a, 2014b ) and Brodsky et al. (2016a, 2016b)?we offer some insights into estimating and interpreting market expectations for increases in the federal funds target range at upcoming meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
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How do college students form expectations?
This paper focuses on how college students form expectations about various major-specific outcomes. For this purpose, I collect a panel data set of Northwestern University undergraduates that contains their subjective expectations about major-specific outcomes. Although students tend to be overconfident about their future academic performance, they revised their expectations in expected ways. The updating process is found to be consistent with a Bayesian learning model. I show that learning plays a role in the decision to switch majors, and that major-switchers respond to information from ...
Working Paper
Attention and Fluctuations in Macroeconomic Uncertainty
I show that economic agents’ attention to macroeconomic events can increase macroeconomic uncertainty during recessions. Agents face uncertainty about the aggregate state of the economy, receive dispersed information about it, and can pay attention to acquire more information. When the economy is in a bad state, agents choose to pay more attention, and their collective response increases three common measures of uncertainty: (i) aggregate output volatility, (ii) forecast dispersion about output, and (iii) subjective uncertainty about output. Uncertainty driven by agents’ attention implies ...
Working Paper
Overconfidence, Subjective Perception, and Pricing Behavior
We study the implications of overconfidence for price setting in a monopolistic competition setup with incomplete information. Our price-setters overestimate their abilities to infer aggregate shocks from private signals. The fraction of uninformed firms is endogenous; firms can obtain information by paying a fixed cost. We find two results: (1) overconfident firms are less inclined to acquire information, and (2) prices might exhibit excess volatility driven by nonfundamental noise. We explore the empirical predictions of our model for idiosyncratic price volatility.
Working Paper
Understanding the Aggregate Effects of Credit Frictions and Uncertainty
We examine the interaction of uncertainty and credit frictions in a New Keynesian framework. To do so, uncertainty is modeled as time-varying stochastic volatitlity - the product of monetary policy uncertainty, financial risk (micro-uncertainty), and macrouncertainty. The model is solved using a pruned third-order approximation and estimated by the Simulated Method of Moments. We find that: 1) Micro-uncertainty aggravates the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, worsens credit conditions, and has first-order effects on real economic activity. 2) When credit conditions are ...
Discussion Paper
Political Polarization in Consumer Expectations
Following the 2016 presidential election, as noted on this blog and many other outlets, Americans’ political and economic outlook changed dramatically depending on partisan affiliation. Immediately after the election, Republicans became substantially more optimistic relative to Democrats. In this blog post, we revisit the issue of polarization over the past twelve months using data from the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)—also the focus of a detailed technical overview in the latest edition of the Bank’s journal, the Economic Policy Review. The overview walks ...
Working Paper
The Role of Information in Pharmaceutical Advertising: Theory and Evidence
This paper theoretically and empirically examines the role of information in the practice of pharmaceutical detailing (promotional interactions between drug representatives and physicians). We start with a theoretical framework in which pharmaceutical firms target detailing visits to physicians who potentially learn about drug quality and prescribe it to their patients. We derive several predictions about the role of information in these visits, which we then test empirically using Medicare Part D prescriptions and pharmaceutical detailing visit data. We find there is little empirical ...