Search Results
Report
Payment networks in a search model of money
In a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory that gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can pay a cost to access a central database that tracks payments made and received. Incentives must be provided to agents to access the central database and to produce when they participate in this arrangement. We also study policies that can loosen these incentive constraints. In particular, we show that a "no-surcharge" rule has good incentive properties. Finally, we compare our model with that of Cavalcanti and Wallace.
Working Paper
Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations in Adverse Selection Economies
An equilibrium concept in the Debreu (1954) theory-of-value tradition is developed for a class of adverse selection economies and applied to the Spence signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection environments. The equilibrium exists and is optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. The economies are large with a finite number of types that maximize expected utility on an underlying commodity space. An implication of the analysis is that the invisible hand works for this class of adverse selection economies.
Report
Regulating Decentralized Systems: Evidence from Sanctions on Tornado Cash
Blockchain-based systems are run by a decentralized network of participants and are designed to be censorship-resistant. We use sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of Treasury on Tornado Cash (TC), a smart contract protocol, to study the impact and effectiveness of regulation in decentralized systems. We document an immediate and lasting impact on TC following the sanction announcement, measured by market reaction, transaction volume, and diversity of users. Still, net flows into TC contracts recover to and surpass pre-announcement levels for most pools, supporting viability of TC. ...
Working Paper
Optimal Bidder Selection in Clearing House Default Auctions
Default auctions at central counterparties (or 'CCPs') are critically important to financial stability. However, due to their unique features and challenges, standard auction theory results do not immediately apply. This paper presents a model for CCP default auctions that incorporates the CCP's non-standard objective of maximizing success above a threshold rather than revenue, the key question of who participates in the auction and the potential for information leakage affecting private portfolio valuations. We show that an entry fee, by appropriately inducingmembers to participate or not, ...
Working Paper
Important Factors Determining Fintech Loan Default: Evidence from the LendingClub Consumer Platform
This study examines key default determinants of fintech loans, using loan-level data from the LendingClub consumer platform during 2007–2018. We identify a robust set of contractual loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, and macroeconomic variables that are important in determining default. We find an important role of alternative data in determining loan default, even after controlling for the obvious risk characteristics and the local economic factors. The results are robust to different empirical approaches. We also find that homeownership and occupation are important factors in ...
Working Paper
Operational Loss Recoveries and the Macroeconomic Environment: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Sector
Using supervisory data from large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we document that operational loss recovery rates decrease in macroeconomic downturns. This procyclical relationship varies by business lines and loss event types and is robust to alternative data aggregations, macroeconomic measurement horizons and estimation methodologies. Further analysis shows that resource constraints faced by BHC risk management functions are a plausible explanation for these patterns. Our findings offer new evidence on how economic shocks transmit to banking industry losses with implications for risk ...
Working Paper
Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates
We ?nd that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without ?nancial covenants?so-called covenant-lite loans?borrowing ?rms? revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional ?nancial covenants. This split structure gives revolving lenders the exclusive right and ability to monitor and to renegotiate the ?nancial covenants, and we con?rm that loans with split control rights are still subject to the discipline of ?nancial covenants. We provide evidence that split control rights are designed to mitigate ...
Working Paper
Marketplace Lending and Consumer Credit Outcomes : Evidence from Prosper
In 2005, Prosper launched the first peer-to-peer lending website in the US, allowing for consumers to apply for and receive loans entirely online. To understand the effect of this new credit source, we match application-level data from Prosper to credit bureau data. Post application, borrowers' credit scores increase and their credit card utilization rates fall relative to non-borrowers in the short run. In the longer run, total debt levels for borrowers are higher that of non-borrowers. Differences in mortgage debt are particularly large and increasing over time. Despite increased debt ...
Journal Article
Financial Engineering Versus Cancer
If financial engineering can distribute the pecuniary risk of medical research, then it can play a role in curing cancer.
Report
Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets
Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits ...