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Working Paper
Optimal Bidder Selection in Clearing House Default Auctions
Central counterparties' ability to hold successful default auctions is critically important to financial stability. However, due to the unique features of these auctions, standard auction theory results do not apply. We present a model of CCP default auctions that incorporates both the vital, but non-standard, objective of minimizing the likelihood it suffers reputationally damaging losses and the potential for information leakage to affect CCP members' private portfolio valuations. This gives insight into the key question of how CCPs should select auction participants. In particular, we ...
Working Paper
Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly
In this paper, we show that information trade has similar characteristics to a natural monopoly, where competition may be detrimental to efficiency due either to the duplication of direct costs or the slowing down of information dissemination. We present a model with two large populations in which consumers are randomly matched to providers on a period-by-period basis. Despite a moral hazard problem, cooperation can be sustained through an institution that gives incentives to information exchange. We consider different information pricing mechanisms (membership vs. buy and sell) and different ...
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Stablecoin Disintermediation
We propose a theory of stablecoin disintermediation, whereby stablecoins not only erode banks’ deposit franchises but also transmit liquidity stress to the banking system. Using transaction-level data linking on-chain transactions to wholesale interbank payments, we document the first evidence of liquidity-driven bank disintermediation. Stablecoins directly transmit liquidity shocks to the banking system: banks with stablecoin deposits experience substantial increases in payment demand and heightened liquidity exposure to daily stablecoin primary market activity. Consistent with theory, ...
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All-to-All Trading in the U.S. Treasury Market
Although the U.S. Treasury market remains the deepest and most liquid securities market in the world, several episodes of market dysfunction over recent years have brought the market’s resilience into focus. The adoption of all-to-all trading in the Treasury market could be one avenue to strengthening market resilience. Conceptually, all-to-all trading would allow any market participant to trade directly with any other market participant. This could be helpful in times of stress when the capacity of traditional intermediaries may be tested. In this article, we discuss what all-to-all ...
Working Paper
Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly
Many markets rely on information intermediation to sustain cooperation between large communities.We identify a key trade-off in costly information intermediation: intermediaries can create trust by incentivizing information exchange, but with too much information acquisition, intermediation becomes expensive, with a resulting high equilibrium default rate and a low fraction of agents buying this information. The particular pricing scheme and the competitive environment affect the direct and indirect costs of information transmission, represented by fees paid by consumers and the expected loss ...
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Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets
Trades in today’s financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits ...
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Financial System Architecture and Technological Vulnerability
This paper presents a framework to study of technological resiliency of financial system architecture. Financial market infrastructures, or platforms, compete with services critical functions along various stages in the lifecycle of a trade, and make investments in technological resiliency to guard against attackers seeking to exploit system weaknesses. Platforms’ financial network effects attenuate competition between platforms on security. Exposure to vulnerabilities is magnified in the presence of strategic adversaries. Private provision of technological resiliency is generally ...
Working Paper
Optimal Bidder Selection in Clearing House Default Auctions
Default auctions at central counterparties (or 'CCPs') are critically important to financial stability. However, due to their unique features and challenges, standard auction theory results do not immediately apply. This paper presents a model for CCP default auctions that incorporates the CCP's non-standard objective of maximizing success above a threshold rather than revenue, the key question of who participates in the auction and the potential for information leakage affecting private portfolio valuations. We show that an entry fee, by appropriately inducingmembers to participate or not, ...
Working Paper
The Intersection of U.S. Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms, Bank Liquidity Requirements, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System
The most recent changes to money market fund regulations have had a strong impact on the money fund industry. In the months leading up to the compliance date of the core provisions of the amended regulations, assets in prime money market funds declined significantly, while those in government funds increased contemporaneously. This reallocation from prime to government funds has contributed to the latter's increased demand for debt issued by the U.S. government and government-sponsored enterprises. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System played a key role in meeting this heightened demand ...
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Zero Settlement Risk Token Systems
How might modern settlement systems with distributed ledger technology achieve zero settlement risk? We consider the design of settlement systems that satisfies two integral features: information-leakage proof and zero settlement risk. Legacy settlement systems partition private information but are vulnerable to settlement fails. A token system with dynamic ownership representation, or a dynamic ledger, can be designed to achieve both, as long as it employs a protocol that enforces two restrictions: programs must be immediately implemented and must involve transactions based on verifiable ...