Discussion of \"objectives of bank management.\"
Raising the deposit-insurance limit: a bad idea whose time has come?
Federal deposit insurance protects the savings of small depositors, but it increases the likelihood that banks will take risks they otherwise would not have. Some bankers have suggested doubling the level of coverage to $200,000. While such an increase may put smaller banks on a par with larger ones, it exceeds the amount necessary to protect small savers and is unfair to taxpayers.
An end to too big to let fail? The Dodd-Frank Act's orderly liquidation authority
One of the changes introduced by the sweeping new financial market legislation of the Dodd?Frank Act is the provision of a formal process for liquidating large financial firms?something that would have been useful in 2008, when troubles at Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Merrill Lynch threatened to damage the entire U.S. financial system. While it may not be the end of the too-big-to-fail problem, the orderly liquidation authority is an important new tool in the regulatory toolkit. It will enable regulators to safely close and wind up the affairs of those distressed financial firms whose failure ...
Anticipating bailouts: the incentive-conflict model and the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund
An examination of the effect of the collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund on insured financial institutions in the context of the incentive-conflict model developed by Edward Kane, finding that differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms tend to reaffirm that taxpayer-funded bailouts are a natural outgrowth of the moral-hazard problem that taxpayers face.
Capital requirements and optimal bank portfolios: a reexamination
An examination of the impact of increased capital requirements on bank portfolio behavior, finding that although the variance of earnings and the incentive to increase leverage are reduced with risk- and leverage-related interest rates, the impact of increased capital requirements on portfolio behavior is generally ambiguous.
How well does bankruptcy work when large financial firms fail? Some lessons from Lehman Brothers
There is disagreement about whether large and complex financial institutions should be allowed to use U.S. bankruptcy law to reorganize when they get into financial difficulty. We look at the Lehman example for lessons about whether bankruptcy law might be a better alternative to bailouts or to resolution under the Dodd-Frank Act?s orderly liquidation authority. We find that there is no clear evidence that bankruptcy law is insufficient to handle the resolution of large complex financial firms.
Large shareholders and market discipline in a regulated industry: a clinical study of Mellon Bank
An analysis of the 1987 change in control at Mellon, which was one of only a few banks with a large shareholder. It finds that the large shareholder did not monitor the firm extensively before it experienced performance difficulties, but was able to enforce a management change when problems arose without having to acquire a majority stake.
PSAF, economic capital, and the new Basel Accord
The 1980 Monetary Control Act requires Reserve Banks to recover their costs of providing payments services over time, including a normal return on capital-that is, the same after-tax return on equity that a private firm would require. To date, this private-sector adjustment factor has been estimated and applied as a single hurdle rate for all Reserve Bank payments services. Capital budgeting theory suggests that firms should use a different hurdle rate for each distinct type of activity according to its risks. For Reserve Bank payments services, this might entail estimating separate ...
Monitoring and controlling bank risk: does risky debt serve any purpose?
To examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk-taking, the authors extract the credit-spread curve for each banking firm in their sample. After controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables, they find that changes in credit spreads do not reflect changes in bank risk variables. The result is robust to firm type, examination rating, size, leverage, and profitability, as well as to different model specifications. They also find that issuing subordinated debt does not alter banks' risk-taking behavior. They conclude that ...