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Author:Temzelides, Theodosios 

Working Paper
Robust Dynamic Optimal Taxation and Environmental Externalities
We study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which agents are concerned about model uncertainty regarding climate change. An externality from greenhouse gas emissions damages the economy's capital stock. We assume that the mapping from climate change to damages is subject to uncertainty, and we use robust control theory techniques to study efficiency and optimal policy. We obtain a sharp analytical solution for the implied environmental externality and characterize dynamic optimal taxation. A small increase in the concern about model uncertainty can cause a significant drop in optimal fossil fuel use. The optimal tax that restores the socially optimal allocation is Pigouvian. Under more general assumptions, we develop a recursive method and solve the model computationally. We find that the introduction of uncertainty matters qualitatively and quantitatively. We study optimal output growth in the presence and in the absence of concerns about uncertainty and find that these concerns can lead to substantially different conclusions.
AUTHORS: Li, Xin; Narajabad, Borghan N.; Temzelides, Theodosios
DATE: 2014-05-29

Journal Article
Are bank runs contagious?
History shows that banks are subject to runs and panics. Researchers disagree, however, about whether runs are contagious: that is, do problems at insolvent banks spread to solvent ones? If runs are contagious, what, if anything, can be done to stop the spread, and what are the implications for deposit insurance and banking regulations? In this article, Ted Temzelides reviews the basic theory and presents some recent evidence on contagious bank runs
AUTHORS: Temzelides, Theodosios
DATE: 1997

Working Paper
Private money and reserve management in a random matching model
The authors introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which the authors identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a central clearinghouse, which they call the treasury. The liabilities are redeemed according to a stochastic process that depends on the endogenous trades. The treasury removes the banking technology from banks that are not able to meet the redemptions in a given period. This, together with the market incompleteness, gives rise to a reserve management problem for the issuing banks. The authors demonstrate that "sufficiently patient" banks will concentrate on improving their reserve position instead of pursuing additional issue. The model provides a first attempt to reconcile limited note issue with optimizing behavior by banks during the National Banking Era.
AUTHORS: Cavalcanti, Ricardo de O.; Erosa, Andres; Temzelides, Theodosios
DATE: 1997

Working Paper
Money talks
The authors study credible information transmission by a benevolent central bank. They consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since the objectives of the central bank and those of individual investors are not always aligned, private investors might rationally ignore announcements by the central bank. In contrast, information transmission through changes in the interest rate creates a distortion, thus lending an amount of credibility. This induces the private investors to rationally take into account information revealed through monetary policy.
AUTHORS: Hoerova, Marie; Monnet, Cyril; Temzelides, Theodosios
DATE: 2009

Working Paper
Evolution, coordination, and banking panics
AUTHORS: Temzelides, Theodosios
DATE: 1995

Working Paper
Beliefs, competition, and bank runs
AUTHORS: Temzelides, Theodosios; Adao, Bernadino
DATE: 1995

Working Paper
A dynamic model of the payment system
The authors study the design of efficient intertemporal payment arrangements when the ability of agents to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and unobservable shocks. Efficiency is achieved via a payment system that assigns balances to participants, adjusts them based on the histories of transactions, and periodically resets them through settlement. Their analysis addresses two key issues in the design of actual payment systems. First, efficient use of information requires that agents participating in transactions that do not involve monitoring frictions subsidize those that are subject to such frictions. Second, the payment system should explore the trade-off between higher liquidity costs from settlement and the need to provide intertemporal incentives. In order to counter a higher exposure to default, an increase in settlement costs implies that the volume of transactions must decrease, but also that the frequency of settlement must increase. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 07-14
AUTHORS: Temzelides, Theodosios; Monnet, Cyril; Koeppl, Thorsten
DATE: 2007

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