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Author:Tabellini, Guido 

Working Paper
The optimality of nominal contracts
AUTHORS: Freeman, Scott; Tabellini, Guido
DATE: 1991

Conference Paper
Money, deficit and public debt: an empirical investigation
AUTHORS: Vincenzo La Via; Tabellini, Guido
DATE: 1986

Conference Paper
Monetary regimes and fiscal deficits: a comparative analysis
AUTHORS: Masciandaro, Donato; Tabellini, Guido
DATE: 1987

Discussion Paper
Federal fiscal constitutions part 1: risk sharing and moral hazard
Inspired by the current European developments, we study equilibrium fiscal policy under alternative constitutional arrangements in a federation of countries. There are two levels of government: local and federal. Local policy redistributes across individuals and affects the probability of aggregate shocks, while federal policy shares international risk. Policies are chosen under majority rule. There is a moral hazard problem: federal risk-sharing can induce the local governments to enact policies that increase local risk. We investigate this incentive problem under alternative fiscal constitutions. In particular, we contrast a vertically ordered system like the EC with a horizontally ordered federal system like the US. These alternative arrangements are not neutral, in the sense that they create different incentives for policymakers and voters, and give rise to different political equilibria. A general conclusion is that, centralization of functions and power can be welfare improving under appropriate institutions. However, this conclusion only applies to the moral hazard problem and a federation where the countries are not too dissimilar.
AUTHORS: Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido
DATE: 1992

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