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Author:Sundaramurthy, Chamu 

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The effects of corporate antitakeover provisions on long-term investment: empirical evidence

This paper's empirical results indicate that the average effect of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long-term investment is negative. The interpretation of these results depends on whether one thinks that there was too much, too little, or just the right amount of long-term investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more refined empirical test of the effects of antitakeover provision adoptions by managers in firms with different incentive and monitoring structures. Governance variables (e.g., percentage of outsiders on corporate boards, and ...
Research Paper , Paper 9618

Report
The differential impact on stockholder wealth of various antitakeover provisions

This paper examines the relationship between the passage of six types of corporate antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) and stockholder wealth. Our event study from a sample of 38l firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions in the 1984-1988 period indicates a strongly negative effect on stockholder wealth, supporting the management entrenchment view of antitakeover provisions. Moreover, the empirical results of this paper indicate that the market reacts equally negatively to both ...
Research Paper , Paper 9512

Report
Board structure, antitakeover provisions, and stockholder wealth

This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984-1988 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firms' board structures. This paper's empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative market reactions.
Research Paper , Paper 9516

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