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Author:Sultanum, Bruno 

Journal Article
Nonparametric Estimation of the Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model

I propose a nonparametric structural estimator for the distribution of liquidity needs in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model when only the aggregate level of withdrawals is observed. The model is an extension of Peck and Shell (2003) with a continuum of depositors. I show how the characterization of the optimal contract proposed in Sultanum (2014) can be used to estimate the distribution of aggregate liquidity needs. The method builds on the literature of estimation of auctions. More precisely, it uses the indirect approach proposed by Guerre et al. (2000). Guerre et al. (2000) ...
Economic Quarterly , Issue Q4 , Pages 261-279

Journal Article
CDS Auctions: An Overview

We discuss the historical background of the credit default swap (CDS) market, why CDS auctions were developed, and the most recent literature. We describe the auction rules using the Toys R Us auction as an example. Furthermore, we discuss the theoretical and empirical results presented in Chernov et al. (2013). Empirically, we extend their data to include more recent CDS auctions. Our results support their findings that dealers have incentive to manipulate the auction price downward when the net open interest is positive. Finally, we use novel dealer-level CDS positions to support Chernov et ...
Economic Quarterly , Issue 2Q , Pages 105-132

Working Paper
Preventing Bank Runs

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as providing a formal rationale for the existence of bank-run equilibria. It has never been clear, however, whether bank-run equilibria in this framework are a natural byproduct of the economic environment or an artifact of suboptimal contractual arrangements. In the class of direct mechanisms, Peck and Shell (2003) demonstrate that bank-run equilibria can exist under an optimal contractual arrangement. The difficulty of preventing runs within this class of mechanism is that banks cannot identify whether withdrawals are being driven by ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2014-19

Journal Article
Inefficiency in a Simple Model of Production and Bilateral Trade

We study a simple model of over-the-counter trade with production. We characterize the equilibrium, and we show that the equilibrium is always inefficient, independent of how the trade surplus is split among trade participants. We argue that this is due to a double hold-up problem that it is at the core of models used to study trade in over-the-counter markets. Finally, we show an example, which we interpret as a limiting case of the general model where the inefficiency vanishes.
Economic Quarterly , Issue 3Q , Pages 137-151

Working Paper
Financial Fragility and Over-the-Counter Markets

This paper studies the interaction between financial fragility and over-the-counter markets. In the model, the financial sector is composed of a large number of investors divided into different groups, which are interpreted as financial institutions, and a large number of dealers. Financial institutions and dealers trade assets in an over-the-counter market la Duffie et al. (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). Investors are subject to privately observed preference shocks, and financial institutions use the balanced team mechanism, proposed by Athey and Segal (2013), to implement an ...
Working Paper , Paper 16-4

Working Paper
Is Money Essential? An Experimental Approach

Working Paper , Paper 21-12

Working Paper
Playing with Money

Experimental studies in monetary economics usually study infinite horizon models. Yet, the time constraints of the laboratory sessions in which these models are conducted create finite horizons that imply monetary equilibria cannot exist. Moreover, laboratory subjects do not treat the probabilistic termination rule typically used in a manner consistent with the discount factor that the rule is intended to replace. Thus, it is unclear whether these experiments evaluate subjects' use of money to ameliorate trading frictions as an equilibrium phenomenon, their inability to understand backward ...
Working Paper , Paper 19-2

Working Paper
Preventing bank runs

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as providing a formal rationale for the existence of bank-run equilibria. It has never been clear, however, whether bank-run equilibria in this framework are a natural byproduct of the economic environment or an artifact of suboptimal contractual arrangements. In the class of direct mechanisms, Peck and Shell (2003) demonstrate that bank-run equilibria can exist under an optimal contractual arrangement. The difficulty of preventing runs within this class of mechanism is that banks cannot identify whether withdrawals are being driven by ...
Working Papers , Paper 2014-21

Briefing
Sovereign CDS Dealers as Market Stabilizers

Economists at the Richmond Fed analyze the role of dealer-provided liquidity in sovereign credit default swap markets. Using newly available data from the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, they track the positions held by large dealers during crises in Ukraine, Venezuela, and Argentina. The researchers find that large dealers tended to increase their provision of insurance as risk increased during those episodes — a finding that is consistent with the notion that they tend to act as market stabilizers during times of turmoil.
Richmond Fed Economic Brief , Volume 20 , Issue 13 , Pages 6 pgs.

Briefing
Preventing Bank Runs

Banking can be defined as the business of maturity transformation, or "borrowing short to lend long." Economists and policymakers have long viewed banking as inherently unstable, that is, prone to runs. This Economic Brief reviews the intuition and theory behind bank runs and the most popular proposed solutions. It also explores new research suggesting that runs might be prevented by creating a new, low-cost type of deposit contract that eliminates the incentive to run.
Richmond Fed Economic Brief , Issue March

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