Option value of credit lines as an explanation of high credit card rates
Credit lines offered by credit cards contain an option arising from changing default probabilities of cardholders. The option value can explain high credit card rates and high profits of card issuers. The card rate producing zero profit for card issuers is higher than interest rates on most other loans because rational cardholders borrow more money when they become riskier. Furthermore, cardholders borrowing when the option is out of the money may be less responsive to credit cared rates due to higher switching costs and carelessness. Card issuers, therefore, keep card rates at high levels ...
Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?
In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer--that is, maximize put option value--by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing charter value. Focusing on the relationship between book value, market value, and a risk measure, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at which put option value starts to dominate charter value. From these estimates, we infer the extent to which the ...
Why did thrift goodwill matter in 1989?
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 limits thrift goodwill that can be counted as regulatory capital. This paper examines if and why the goodwill clause adversely affected the market value of thrifts. The main findings are that goodwill had a large negative effect on the stock returns of low-capital thrifts in 1989 and that the negative effect persisted in the following two years. These findings suggest that a reduced put option value accounted for a large portion of the stock-price decline. The role of asymmetric information appears to have been small.
Market discipline by depositors: evidence from reduced form equations
This paper examines the effects of the estimated probability of bank failure on the growth rates of large time deposits and interest rates on those deposits. While riskier banks paid higher interest rates, they attracted less large time deposits in the second half of the 1980s. These results indicate that risky banks faced unfavorable supply schedules of large time deposits and, hence, support the presence of market discipline by large time depositors. The empirical analysis also considers the effects of bank size, but fails to find evidence that depositors preferred large banks.
The bank capital requirement and information asymmetry
This paper recognizes two main factors that cause the capital requirement to affect the weighted average cost of capital and hence the investment behavior of banks: underpriced debt resulting from the deposit insurance and information asymmetry between managers and the stock market. For a bank enjoying a low cost of debt (deposits), an increased proportion of equity financing raises the weighted average cost ofcapital. When the stock market underestimates the value of a bank due to information asymmetry, equity financing is expensive. This paper finds that banks constrained by the tightened ...